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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY SCIENCE

MARSHAL OGARKOV: MILITARY, TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 2, Oct 86 pp 5-6

[Article by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov]

[Text] The most important tenets advocated by the Soviet military doctrine are to maintain the Soviet Armed Forces in high combat, readiness, ensure their quick deployment in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy, strike at the enemy with a series of devastating retaliatory blows and by so doing face the tasks ensuing from the need to defend the Socialist Fatherland. Hence the Soviet military doctrine says the Armed Forces must be able not only to defend the country against a potential aggressor by countering it with passive means and defensive tactics but also to deliver crushing counter-attacks at the enemy so as to overwhelm it under whatever circumstances.

The chief principle underlying the Soviet military doctrine has always implied and is still doing so, that the USSR must be prepared to deliver a retaliatory strike involving defensive actions. For the USSR considers a nuclear attack as a grave crime against mankind. The Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal has never been regarded in this country as a "strategic offensive force," as it is frequently referred to in the United States. The Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the assumption that the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has unilaterally pledged never to do so and announced its decision to the whole world.

The Soviet military doctrine lays great stress on providing the Armed Forces with modern armaments and hardware. It implies that the socialist economy has advanced to an extent that it can cope technically with the most intricate defence issues and develop within a short time period any sophisticated weapon to be used for defending the Fatherland.

The military and technical aspects of the Soviet military doctrine incorporate the basic tenets of the Soviet military school concerning methods and forms of hostilities under different combat conditions. It provides for a vigorous and decisive military action, relying on the military might of the state and its Armed Forces, to seek a complete destruction of an aggressor, if the latter dares to attack our country.

Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, b. 1917, Hero of the Soviet Union and Lenin Prize winner; graduated from the Military Engineering Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff; served as an engineer officer of a regiment, brigade and division during World War II and as staff officer and commander in the postwar years. Since 1968, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and Deputy Defence Minister of the USSR. Since 1977, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and First Deputy Defence Minister of the USSR. Since 1984, a senior officer at the Soviet Defence Ministry.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

MARSHAL SOKOLOV: THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 1, Sep 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Marshal Sergei Sokolov, USSR Minister of Defense]

[Text] The Soviet military policy is closely linked with our country's constructive aims and tasks and is carried out within the framework of the peaceable foreign policy of the USSR. The Soviet military doctrine, which is of the purely defensive character, fully accords with this line. In this connection it is necessary to say that the continuous attempts by Western politicians and ideologists to ascribe aggressive, expansionist features to the Soviet military doctrine are absolutely groundless.

It is common knowledge that any military doctrine has two aspects, political and military-technical. The political aspect prevails. Its content is fully determined by the policy pursued by the specific state. From Lenin's Decree on Peace to our days the policy of the Soviet state has been a clear and consistent policy of peace. The resolve to pursue it persistently and undeviatingly was reaffirmed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in his Statement on January 15, 1986.

As to the military-technical aspect of the Soviet doctrine, its content is fully subordinated to the CPSU's demand to maintain the Armed Forces in constant combat readiness for stemming the intrigues of imperialism against the USSR and its allies, for resolutely routing any aggressor. In line with this demand the technical equipment of the Army and Navy is ensured. Our country is now able to accomplish any scientific-technological task and to prevent military superiority over itself, whether on Earth or in space. But we are in principle against the arms race and space militarization. There are many proofs of this, such as the Soviet Union's renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons; our moratorium on any nuclear explosions (the practical programme for reducing nuclear weapons up to their complete elimination by the year 2000, set forth in the Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15, 1986, says in particular: "The USSR and the USA should from the very beginning agree to stop all nuclear explosions and call upon other states to join in such a moratorium as soon as possible"--ed.); the halting of the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe; the statement that we shall not be the first to station weapons in space; and our preparedness also for other radical measures for disarmament.

Sergei Sokolov's Biography

Born in 1911 into the family of an office worker. Serves in the Soviet Army since 1932. Graduated from the Military Academy of Armoured and Mechanised Troops in 1947, and the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1951. During the Great Patriotic War was chief of staff under the commander of the armoured and mechanised troops of a front and commander of the armoured and mechanised troops of an army. In the postwar years--commander of an armoured regiment and of a mechanised division, chief of staff of an army, commander of an army. From 1960--chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, from 1964--first deputy commander and from 1965--commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District. From April 1967--First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR. In 1984 was appointed USSR Minister of Defence. From April 1985--Alternate Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee.

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WARSAW PACT

WARSAW PACT C-IN-C MARSHAL KULIKOV URGES DIRECT TALKS WITH NATO

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 5, Dec 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Marshal Viktor Kulikov, C-in-C of the Warsaw Treaty Member States' Joint Armed Forces]

[Text] New prospects for European security have turned up after the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. It has shown an upgrade in East-West dialogue and that there is a real opportunity to end Europeans' fear of extinction in a nuclear war.

The question now is how to use this opportunity.

Neither the USSR nor the Warsaw Treaty Organisation have ever sought European or world hegemony. We have no military doctrine other than defensive.

I am far from assuming West Europeans don't know it. They also know that major, vigorous steps to improve the continent's political atmosphere have been taken by the East European states. Those steps embody the new way of thinking, and show what kind of thinking it should be in today's Europe. Among them is the comprehensive programme of creating a non-nuclear world by the year 2000, set out in Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement on January 15, 1986. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, continuing for 17 months now, was an important contribution to it. Meanwhile, the Americans have carried out 23 nuclear weapon tests.

A good example of the Warsaw Treaty states' basically new approach to European security is their programme for reducing the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, and proposals to free Europe from chemical weapons, create non-nuclear zones in the Balkans, in Central Europe, in the continent's north and other areas, sign with the NATO states a treaty on mutual non-use of military force and maintenance of relations of peace and establish direct contacts between the two organisations to continue the dialogue. Our initiative for the simultaneous dissolution of the WTO and NATO and as a first step the liquidation of their military organizations, also remains valid.

Yet West European governments and influential NATO officials feign unawareness of our proposals. They still adhere to the old approach, as though mountains of arms, especially nuclear, were helping to preserve peace. They still talk of "concern" and "uncertainty about the future," and they want to "know the truth about the Soviet Union's intentions now, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow." But one is tempted to ask: If you doubt, then why don't you respond to our proposals? If they don't suit you--let's together search for mutually acceptable options. We're ready for a frank exchange of opinions to benefit detente.

VIKTOR KULIKOV, b. 1921. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Graduate of M.V. Frunze Military Academy and Military Academy of General Staff. During World War II, company commander, battalion, later brigade staff chief. After the war, in different Soviet Army commanding positions. From 1967 commander of Kiev Military District. From 1969 C-in-C of the Soviet Forces Group in Germany. From 1971 Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces--USSR First Deputy Minister of Defence. Since 1977, USSR First Deputy Minister of Defence--Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States.

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WARSAW PACT

ZAIKOV ON WARSAW TREATY

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 4, Nov 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Lev Zaikov, Politbureau member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee]

[Text] The Warsaw Treaty members propose coming to terms on a substantial reduction--by 1 million men--of not only all components of the ground forces, but of the tactical strike aircraft of European states, and of the relevant forces and arms of the USA and Canada located in Europe. At the same time, in addition to the conventional arms, tactical nuclear arms with an under 1,000-kilometre range would likewise be subject to cuts. The whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, would be the geographic zone of reduction.

These proposals on cuts in the military forces and conventional arms in Europe supplement the programme for eliminating weapons of mass destruction put forward by the Soviet Union. At the same time they bear an extremely important character for Europe since their aim is to prevent here not only nuclear war, but warfare involving conventional arms. It is well known that Western propaganda often uses a thesis of "superiority" of the USSR and its allies in Europe in conventional forces and arms. The proposals by the Warsaw Treaty members fault these allegations and provide a real basis for agreement on all the issues to military detente, dismantling arms and guaranteeing security for all nations.

LEV ZAIKOV, b. 1923. Education: Leningrad Institute of Engineering and Economics. Fitter since 1940, later foreman, shop superintendent, director and director-general of a science-production association.

Since 1976 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Soviet. Since 1983 First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee. Member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (up to 1986). Member of the CPSU Central Committee. Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (since 1985). Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee (elected by a Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on March 6, 1986).

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WARSAW PACT

CONVENTIONAL ARMS--WARSAW TREATY--NATO POWER BALANCE CONTINUES

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 4, Nov 86 pp 2-3

[Article by Colonel Vasili Morozov]

[Text] In determining the power balance in conventional arms one should remember that this is a very complicated matter, which the West often exploits, adducing data that distort reality. A variety of tricks is known, for example, that "prove" the existence of a Soviet "superiority" and deny an approximate power balance in conventional arms. First of all, figures are deliberately overstated for the armed forces of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a whole, while understating the indices for the armed forces of the NATO countries. In addition, the reserve formations of NATO armies and the depot stockpiles of arms are ignored, and Spain and France do not figure in the count. Often weapon types are picked from the general mix of arms showing a correlation advantageous for NATO.

Actually, neither the USSR nor the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a whole has any superiority over the USA or NATO in conventional arms. For all the differences in structure and makeup of armed forces, neither side has an edge, of which the following data are evidence.

NATO has 94 battle-ready divisions in Europe (counting the French and Spanish), whilst the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 78. Moreover, the numerical strength of a US division is 16,000-19,000 men (24,000 for a West German division) whereas the average figure for divisions of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries does not exceed 11,000. The cited figures convincingly show on whose side the actual superiority in such an important indicator as battle-ready divisions is.

There are in the NATO forces in Europe (Spain and France included) over 18,000 tanks, not counting the 2,000-plus American tanks and over 6,000 tanks of the bloc's West European members kept in depots in Western Europe. So the total of tanks in the NATO countries' possession is about 27,000, that is, as many as those of the Warsaw Treaty states.

Having an advantage in anti-tank weapons and about the same amount of artillery and armoured equipment with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, NATO is a little worse off in tactical aircraft. In the field of naval forces NATO's superiority in combat ships of the main classes (aircraft carriers, air-capable ships, battleships, etc) compensates with a vengeance for the Warsaw Treaty states' larger number of submarines and small surface ships.

Authoritative Western sources also acknowledge the existence of a rough conventional arms balance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The annual report of the London Institute for Strategic Studies ("The 1985 Military Balance"), published in 1986, says bluntly that in conventional arms the NATO-Warsaw Treaty balance remains such that it makes military attack a very risky enterprise because neither side has the aggregate might to guarantee victory.

One still can often encounter an argument that "the population of the USSR is large, and so is its human potential in the army." At the same time they forget to tell their readers what characterises similar indicators for the NATO side. Actually, the NATO countries' population numbers are 1.5 times greater than the Warsaw Treaty states' (620:375 million).

Even the Pentagon's booklet "Soviet Military Power" admits that the troop level of NATO is 5.6 million men, and that of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 4.9 million.

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ARMED FORCES

'RAISE ROLE OF SERGEANTS, PETTY OFFICERS'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jan 87 p 1

[Unsigned lead article: "Raise Role of Sergeants, Petty Officers"]

[Text] At the present stage of development of the army and navy the role of sergeants and petty officers as assistants to officers and warrant officers is increasing significantly. The improvement of weapons and military equipment, reduction of the time available to master them, growing complexity of combat missions, intensification of the training process and increase in the role of independent operations by small subunits in combat all are making higher demands upon junior commanders. They must be politically competent, have firm methodological skills and good professional training, and be able to indoctrinate the soldiers and maintain regulatory order. A mandatory condition for this is that they set the example in fulfilling their military duty, make high demands upon their subordinates, display personal self-discipline and discipline and strictly observe moral and ethical norms of conduct.

Increasing the role of sergeants and petty officers is inseparably linked with improving the work of military commissariats in the selection of candidates for training subunits and detachments and with perfecting the training of junior commanders in the army and navy. At the same time, training units and subunits must be models of regulatory order, discipline and self-discipline. Here it is especially necessary to display constant concern about introducing advanced methodology and the latest recommendations of military pedagogy and psychology. Instances of removing students for various types of economic work during class hours and of poor use of the training material and technical base cannot be tolerated.

In the units and on the ships there are favorable conditions for improving the ideological tempering of sergeants and petty officers and perfecting their commanders' qualities and skills. Take, for example, the Red Banner Tank Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol, Belorussian Military District. There subunit commanders, political workers and party and komsomol organizations are carrying out purposeful work with sergeants. It begins with studying the personal qualities of the junior commanders arriving at the regiment. The plan for commander's training of sergeants is strictly fulfilled. Particular attention is paid to intensification of the training process, organization of

At the same time there are, unfortunately, subunits, units and ships where the level of training and indoctrination of sergeants and petty officers does not fully meet present requirements. It even happens that officers complain about the low activeness of junior commanders and themselves take the path of trivial tutelage and taking over for them. Individual work with this category of military personnel remains a weak point. As a result, some sergeants and petty officers have insufficient professional training, do not have the necessary zeal toward fulfilling their duties and themselves violate military order or, attempting to "dispose" their subordinates to themselves, permit familiarity and reduce demandingness toward them. For example, the battalion where Gds Capt N. Shostalo is serving, and certain other subunits in "N" unit (Northern Group of Forces) lost the positions they previously won, largely due to the fact that sergeants turned out to be not at the necessary level.

Shortcomings in the work of sergeants and petty officers have a negative effect on the situation in units and on ships. Commanders, political organs and staffs should become more actively involved in their indoctrination and training, arm them with advanced methodology and seek to ensure that each junior commander meets the requirements of his assignment. It is necessary to inculcate in sergeants and petty officers the ability to command their subordinates firmly and competently in modern combat and to use effectively the organic weapons of the squads, crews, teams and combat posts. For this purpose it is necessary to conduct practical exercises and lessons against a complex tactical background, under conditions which demand a display of will, boldness and resourcefulness of the sergeants and petty officers. It is also important to raise physical tempering and the level of drill training of junior commanders and seek to ensure their exemplary military bearing and outward appearance.

Sergeants and petty officers are closest of all to their subordinates, the soldiers and sailors, and have the best opportunity to know the personal qualities of each of them thoroughly and to maintain regulatory order and a healthy moral climate from reveille to retreat. Success here, practice shows, depends most of all on how persistently each junior commander improves his knowledge and skills and uses intelligently the authority granted to him.

All the various forms and methods of working with sergeants and petty officers must be subordinated to the inculcation in them of commanders' qualities. For example, an effective form of training and indoctrination is through specific critiques of the activity of junior commanders, which cite examples. During the critique their ability to conduct the lesson and training, maintain regulatory order and self-discipline and create an atmosphere of friendship, comradeship and mutual assistance in the military collective is analyzed. Such critiques become more useful when they disclose the essence of advanced experience, analyze omissions and indicate ways to eliminate shortcomings.

Questions of raising the authority of junior commanders and ensuring that they set good examples in their training, service and conduct must be an item of daily concern of party and komsomol organizations. It is necessary to imbue sergeants and petty officers with a feeling of personal responsibility for the fulfillment of their military duty and to support their demandingness, strengthen their authority, involve them widely in social work and encourage

initiative and valuable undertakings. Party and komsomol activists must not close their eyes to mistakes made by junior commanders. It is necessary to give a principled assessment of the contribution of each to improving combat readiness and strengthening discipline.

The crucial tasks of the training year require intensive labor from army and navy personnel. Sergeants and petty officers have an important role in solving them at a high level of quality and in fulfilling the commitments made in the competition under the slogan, "We will fulfill the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and will mark the 70th Anniversary of Great October with selfless military labor!" The more responsibly and energetically they fulfill their commitment, the weightier their contribution will be to improving the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships.

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ARMED FORCES

FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY COMMISSARIAT DETAILED

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 9 Dec 87) pp 23-26 (1-7)

[Part of a detachable pamphlet for instructors with own internal pagination, under "VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA Library" rubric: "What the Military Commissariat Must Do to Manage Basic Military Training"; first paragraph is VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA introduction]

[Text] NVP [basic military training] guidance documents state: "Appropriate military commissariats exercise direction of basic military training on the territories of republics, krays, oblasts, okrugs, cities and rayons." As our editorial mail shows, however, military commissariats do not always cope with this task and do not know just what they must do for this. It would appear that the article published below will assist them.

It is common knowledge that military commissariats manage basic military training of the youth. Military commissariats are called upon to unify and coordinate the efforts of all interested entities to ensure a high level of basic military training and together with them monitor its organization and quality.

Let us recall that in accordance with the USSR Law "Universal Military Obligation" and the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on further improvement of young people's preparation for military service, the councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics, executive committees of soviets of people's deputies of krays, oblasts, cities and rayons, and appropriate ministries, state committees, departments and their subordinate entities establish the necessary basic military training facility and ensure selection and training of military instructors for secondary military educational institutions locally together with military commissariats and DOSAAF committees. Commanders, political bodies, chiefs of military chairs of civilian higher educational institutions, and chiefs of CD courses provide constant sponsorial help to organs of public and vocational-technical education, SSh [secondary schools], SPIU [agricultural vocational-technical schools], tekhnikums and training points in organizing and holding classes, improving the basic military training facility, and working on the young people's military-patriotic indoctrination and physical education.

Planning

Success of the military commissariat's work of directing basic military training depends on planning to a considerable extent. In particular, it must ensure the timely selection and appointment of military instructors, instructors of medical-sanitary training, and chiefs and instructors of training points; the conduct of training methods courses and classes with them; a constant improvement in the basic military training facility; and the exercise of supervision.

All this has to be taken into account in drawing up a plan of the principal basic military training activities for the new training year, conduct of which requires joint efforts by organs of public and vocational-technical education, DOSAAF committees, as well as sponsor enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes, military units and military educational institutions. Such a plan usually is drawn up by non-T/O&E methods councils formed under military commissariats and is coordinated with the heads of interested organs and organizations, commanders of military units and chiefs of military educational institutions. The plan is approved at a session of the ispolkom of the local soviet of people's deputies and is appended to the decree on the past year's results of basic military training.

Selection of Candidates for Military Instructor Positions

The military commissariat is responsible for seeing that each educational institution has a well trained military instructor from among reserve officers. The military commissariat keeps a record of military instructors of secondary educational institutions which allows analyzing this staff for at least the last five years.

Each military commissariat, with assistance from organs of public and vocational-technical education, draws up a long-range plan (for at least five years) for selecting candidates for military instructor positions and compiles lists of the reserve officers and NCO's recommended for work in educational institutions, those to be sent to pedagogic institutes (to the basic military training and physical education department), and promising military instructors from among reserve NCO's and privates who must be sent to reserve officer training courses.

Talks are held with possible candidates for military instructor positions (officers and reservists who are registered after being released to the reserve) in which an explanation must be given of the importance and significance of basic military training and of military-patriotic indoctrination, and the role and place of an educational institution's military instructor in the system which prepares young people to defend the Motherland. Participation of persons from local party and soviet organs is desirable in such talks.

Draftees who have proven to be good leaders of Young Pioneer detachments and conscientious commanders of Young Army subunits with initiative also should not be forgotten. It also should be suggested to them to think about work in educational institutions as military instructors. Such young men must be sent

to training units and correspondence maintained with them in order to keep abreast of how their service is going. After these young people return home the military commissariat proposes that they enter a pedagogic institute and receive a specialty as an instructor of basic military training and physical education.

Members of the non-T/O&E methods council under the military commissariat must familiarize themselves with candidates for military instructor positions without fail. The future military instructors are invited to a session of the methods council in which the military commissar, chief of the rayon (city) department of public education, and directors of secondary educational institutions take part.

The military commissariat must persistently strive to see that appropriate work conditions are created for military instructors and that they are not assigned duties not connected with preparing young people for military service.

Methods Work

Methods work is conducted with military instructors of secondary educational institutions and chiefs of training points, and with instructors and masters of production training of DOSAAF schools and agricultural vocational-technical schools. Its purpose is to improve military and specialized knowledge, increase the pedagogic expertise of the aforementioned persons, study and adopt the most effective methods of training and indoctrinating young people, improve the organization of the training process, improve class quality and disseminate foremost experience.

Methods work must be planned promptly and with quality, classes must be prepared thoroughly and in advance, and there must be a good training facility in order to accomplish these tasks. Military commissars, DOSAAF committee chairmen, heads of public and vocational-technical education organs, and officers of military units and military educational institutions must take part in conducting methods classes.

Military commissariats of republics, krays and oblasts exercise direction of the methods work of military instructors. In orders about basic military training results they specify the set of measures aimed at improving military instructors' professional training in the new training year; they unite the efforts of all interested organs through non-T/O&E methods councils; they approve the program of five-day training methods courses for military instructors; they give assistance to rayon and city military commissariats in holding the courses; together with DOSAAF committees they organize and conduct training methods courses with chiefs of training points; and they supervise the conduct of training methods courses and classes with military instructors.

Rayon and city military commissariats together with CD staffs, departments (administrations) of public education, and non-T/O&E methods councils (which include officers of military units and military educational institutions) organize and conduct five-day training methods courses and one-day classes with military instructors.

The FIVE-DAY TRAINING METHODS COURSES are held before the beginning of the training year. Here basic military training results for the past training year are summed up and tasks are set for the new training year; requirements of organizational-methods and guidance documents are studied; demonstration and instructional methods classes are held; unified methods guidelines are given on the most difficult basic military training topics and recommendations are given on effective use of the training facility; and an exchange of experience in training and indoctrinating future soldiers is arranged. Heads of local party and soviet organs, CD staffs, departments (administrations) of public education, public health, internal affairs, DOSAAF and Komsomol committees, and sports committees as well as representatives of finance organs and social security organs are invited to these courses.

To ensure timely and quality preparation for this important activity it is recommended that the plan for conducting the courses be approved no later than six months before their beginning. Military commissariats check the readiness of class instructors and the training facility at the courses before the end of the training year, and approve each lesson plan.

ONE-DAY METHODS CLASSES are organized monthly. Here military instructors master the methodology of studying particular basic military training program subjects which will be covered in the upcoming month. Experience shows that the effectiveness of this activity is higher where instructional methods classes, practical classes, demonstration classes, an open lesson, a lecture or a seminar are provided. The knowledge and abilities which military instructors demonstrate during instructional methods classes, practical classes and seminar classes are recorded in a special log ("Log of Military Instructor Methods Training").

The schedule of monthly one-day classes is drawn up for the entire training year with consideration of the weekly plan of the basic military training program in secondary educational institutions and with consideration of suggestions and wishes of military instructors, and is approved by the rayon or city military commissariat prior to 20 August. If necessary the schedule of one-day classes is updated in a particular month and made known to military instructors no later than a month in advance.

Members of methods councils and officers of military commissariats, military units and military educational institutions are appointed as class instructors.

PRACTICAL SCIENCE CONFERENCES on matters of basic military training and military-patriotic indoctrination are recommended to be held in the rayon (city) once every 2-3 years. Here the directors, military instructors, and instructors of physical culture and medical-sanitary preparation of secondary educational institutions share the experience which has allowed them to achieve high results. It is useful to organize the conference so that there

is an opportunity not only to give a briefing, but also to practically demonstrate the organization and conduct of classes with pupils and show new training instruments, aids and devices which were used in lessons. As a result the conference draws up recommendations for improving military and physical training and military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth.

As a rule, the INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS CLASS is devoted to one of the difficult subjects of the program. It must be used to demonstrate the methodology for giving the lesson and the lesson's material support, to deepen the knowledge of military instructors on the lessons in question, and teach them to execute procedures and actions precisely.

The most experienced military instructor organizes and conducts this class. He first checks the knowledge and abilities of military instructors on the given topic. After this he shows what is necessary for working it (training stations, their material support and so on) and tells how each lesson is studied. Then the military instructors express their suggestions in turn on the methodology of working the lessons. In holding the critique the instructor directs the military instructors' attention to mistakes and errors they made and recommends supplementary training and methods literature.

Exemplary organization of the class, the sequence in working the lessons, effective training methods and forms, and the use of technical equipment and visual aids is demonstrated in the DEMONSTRATION CLASS. It is held with the help of specially prepared pupils. The military instructors also can be shown an ordinary class given by a military instructor who is a good methods specialist. At the end of the class he can answer colleagues' questions, give them advice and recommendations and draw attention to features in studying the given topic.

The PRACTICAL CLASS is conducted to improve the military instructors' knowledge, abilities and skills in the basic military training program. They themselves essentially act as pupils in the class.

The objective of the OPEN CLASS AND LESSON is to develop the most effective methods and procedures for working a particular topic through collective study and discussion. At the end of the discussion the instructor notes positive aspects and deficiencies of the class or lesson and draws a conclusion as to the most advisable forms, methods and procedures of holding it.

LECTURES present fundamental theoretical issues of pedagogics, methodology, creation of the basic military training facility, and military-patriotic indoctrination; analyze literary sources; and give practical advice. The lecture must be accompanied without fail by a showing of diagrams, posters, film clips and so on.

SEMINAR CLASSES usually are held on the most difficult issues and topics in the form of talks according to a previously drawn up plan, discussions of written abstracts, and questions asked the military instructors. In conclusion an evaluation is made of each presentation and the class as a whole. Evaluations are entered in the log of military instructors' methods training.

Submachinegun Firing

This is the most responsible phase in the basic military training work of military commissariats. It includes planning the firings, organizing and holding them if the indoor ranges and firing ranges do not belong to military units or military educational institutions, and exercising supervision over the organization and conduct of firings arranged by military units and military educational institutions.

Firing usually is planned in a period when field training courses are held (draftees undergoing training in military-technical specialties fire submachineguns at the end of training). The place and time of firing is set in the firing plan (schedule) for each secondary educational institution and DOSAAF training organization, and there is an indication of who organizes the firing (military unit, military commissariat, DOSAAF organ) and the number of firers. If the firing is conducted in indoor ranges of military units or military educational institutions, this plan (schedule) is approved by their commanders or chiefs. If the young men are firing in indoor ranges belonging to other organizations, the plan (schedule) is approved by the military commissar. Before the beginning of the training year one copy of the plan (schedule) is sent to the rayon or city department (administration) of public education, and an excerpt from it indicating the time and place of firing is sent to directors of agricultural vocational-technical schools and secondary specialized educational institutions, and to chiefs of DOSAAF training organizations.

Submachinegun firing is organized and conducted in strict compliance with the course for firing small arms and firing from fighting vehicles and tanks of the Ground Forces.

The young men arrive at the indoor range or firing range along with the military instructor, training point chief, or chief of the DOSAAF training organization.

Before firing begins its instructor checks to see how well the young men know the conditions and procedure for performing exercises and the safety measures, and their ability to execute in practice the procedures and rules of fire and the commands according to the exercise condition.

Draftees who do not have the appropriate knowledge, abilities and skills are not allowed to fire and are sent to the educational institution, DOSAAF school or training point for additional classes.

Local party and soviet organs are informed of firing results. The firing plans and lists of firing results are kept in the military commissariat for two years.

In exercising supervision over conduct of firings organized by military units and military educational institutions, the military commissariats see that unprepared young men are not allowed to take part in them, that safety measures are observed and that classes are held at training stations.

Organization of the Showing of Movies on Military-Patriotic Subject Matter

Military commissariats perform this work in accordance with the USSR Minister of Defense order. The work includes drawing up and sending in requisitions to film bases (film points) of district or fleet political directorates or to political departments of armies, flotillas, naval bases or large units [soyedineniye]; compiling a schedule for showing the films; and monitoring the arrangement for their showing.

Requisitions for movies can be submitted both by military commissariats of republics, krays and oblasts as well as by rayon and city military commissariats. The schedule for showing the films is drawn up by the rayon or city military commissariat and coordinated with organs of public and vocational-technical education, directors of agricultural vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums, and DOSAAF committees. It indicates the place and time of the showing, names of the movies, and which educational institutions' (organizations') pupils are taking part in the viewing.

Assistance in Performing Military Sponsorship Work

This is one of the most important duties of rayon and city military commissariats to ensure a high level of young people's preparation for military service.

Military sponsorship work includes drawing up the plan for such work together with the military unit command element; making it known to organs of public education, directors of agricultural vocational-technical schools and secondary specialized educational institutions, and chiefs of DOSAAF training organizations; exercising supervision; and summing up the results of this work.

The plan of military sponsorship work is developed on the basis of the district commander's order with consideration of capabilities of the military unit, subunit, or military educational institution assigned to a rayon or city. The plan indicates which subunits sponsor a particular secondary educational institution, DOSAAF training organization or training point, the time and place for holding general activities (showing the personnel's accommodations, life and routine, weapons and combat equipment; athletic activities; field problems; firings and so on), and the appointed persons responsible. The plan is approved by the military unit commander or chief of the military educational institution and made known by the military commissariats to heads of public education organs, agricultural vocational-technical schools, secondary specialized educational institutions, DOSAAF organizations and enterprises at which training points are established, for the part which concerns them. Based on this the chiefs of DOSAAF training organizations, military instructors of secondary educational institutions and chiefs of training points together with commanders of the assigned subunits draw up more specific plans of military sponsorship work for the training year.

Military commissariats exercise supervision over military sponsorship work during inspections of the status of basic military training in secondary educational institutions and in DOSAAF training organizations. Its results are reflected in decrees of executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies based on results of the past training year.

Assistance in Establishing and Improving the Training Facility

In accordance with requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on further improvement in young people's preparation for military service, military commissariats persistently strive to ensure that a complete basic military training facility complex is established in each secondary educational institution, DOSAAF training organization and training point, and a defense-sports health camp providing quality conduct of field training courses with young men including submachinegun firing and passing norms of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex is established in each rayon and city. Suggestions for organizing and improving a training facility in secondary educational institutions and at training points are given in appropriate recommendations.

It is worthwhile emphasizing that military commissariats are obligated to constantly study the state of the basic military training facility in secondary educational institutions, DOSAAF training organizations and training points as well as local capabilities for its further improvement; to prepare suggestions on this matter for consideration in local party and soviet organs; to monitor fulfillment of decrees adopted on matters of establishing and improving the training facility; to request delivery and arrange for receipt of authorized training weapons and military property in secondary educational institutions and at training points; and arrange to send them off for repair.

Assignment of enterprises to educational institutions has become widespread in the work practice of military commissariats for giving assistance in establishing and improving the basic military training facility. These enterprises arrange for fabrication of nonstandard equipment for training stations and they assist in preparing areas, compounds, military training rooms and weapon storerooms and in seeking opportunities for allocation and repair, for example, of telephone sets and electric motors which have been written off but which are suitable for use in the basic military training process. Where necessary, military commissariats arrange for the cooperation of secondary educational institutions for the purpose of organizing individual elements of the training facility and fabricating various pieces of training equipment and visual aids.

Direction of Field Training Courses

For military commissariats of republics, krays and oblasts this includes holding training methods courses with the chiefs, deputy chiefs and company commanders of defense-sports health camps, giving assistance to rayon and city military commissariats in methods training of platoon commanders, and studying and generalizing positive experience in their work.

For rayon and city military commissariats it includes conducting methods work with platoon commanders and physical training instructors, giving methods help to the chief of a defense-sports health camp in planning the training process and arranging classes with young men, and exercising supervision.

Platoon commanders are trained at training methods courses and one-day classes held with military instructors of secondary educational institutions. Two one-day training methods classes are held on topics which will be covered in field training courses.

Rayon and city military commissariats exercise supervision over organization of the training process at courses not less than once per section. Special attention here is given to their practical and military direction and to organization of physical training classes. Results of the supervision are taken into account in summing up results of basic military training for the training year.

Supervision over the Status of Basic Military Training

This is a very important component of the organizational work of a military commissariat in basic military training. One must recall the statement of V. I. Lenin, who believed that the key of all work and all policy of Soviet authority is the check of people and of the actual job performance. The task lies not only in periodically identifying shortcomings, but in studying their causes and finding ways to remedy them. Therefore supervision over the status of young people's basic military training is above all assurance of prompt and complete fulfillment of requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on further improvement of young people's preparation for military service, the USSR law "Universal Military Obligation," decrees of local party and soviet organs, and plans for the principal basic military training measures.

Rayon and city military commissariats must ensure that every check produces real results; helps organs of public and vocational-technical education, CD staffs, DOSAAF committees, secondary educational institutions and DOSAAF training organizations improve preparation of young people for military service; and teaches them to evaluate their work creatively. All this is possible only with comprehensive preparation of inspectors, who must have good knowledge of everything concerning basic military training and military-patriotic indoctrination.

The work of inspection commission members must be based on high objectivity, principle and businesslike efficiency. They must use their work to ensure complete fulfillment of requirements of normative documents on matters of young people's basic military training and the preparation of specialists for the USSR Armed Forces.

Military commissariats are obligated to inform party and soviet organs about the status of young people's basic military training, usually after summing up results for the training year, after each inspection, and based on results of field training courses.

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6904

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ARMED FORCES

COMPUTER IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Moscow VOYENNIYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 9 Dec 86) p 44

[Article by Col (Res) V. Knyazkov, under the rubric: "Talks with Draftees"]

[Text] When military specialists describe features of modern combat, they note above all its spatial scope, high mobility and decisiveness of troop actions, rapid changes in the situation, massed employment of powerful weapons and finally its transient nature. All this led to a sharp increase in the amount of data needed by the commander and his staff for making the only correct decision without delay. Under conditions of an acute time shortage, any delay in processing data becomes extremely undesirable, since it oftentimes is fraught with very serious consequences.

Science comes to our help: information theory, mathematical statistics, queueing theory, mathematical modeling, game theory and so on; and modern electronic computers for military purposes.

The question naturally arises: Must the command and control system be automatic or automated? Let us recall that if a computer completely replaces man the system is called automatic and the computer is a control computer (in particular, such a system is an inalienable part of on-board equipment of modern intercontinental ballistic missiles). But when both man and the computer are included as mandatory elements in the control process, the "man-machine" system formed is called an automated system and such a computer is called simply a computer.

There is no need to prove that man is fundamentally irremovable from the sphere of control of combat actions.

It should be explained in more detail about just what "data" is taken to mean. This is information or reports on troop actions which already have occurred or which might occur. They are transmitted over technical communications equipment in the form of telephone, telegraph and other signals. They may be recorded on magnetic tape, "punched" on a punched card or punched tape, printed or written on paper or a topographic map, expressed in mathematical formulas, graphs and tables, and also contained in references, regulations and manuals.

The computer is capable of accumulating these mountains of data in its memory, storing them, outputting them at the first request, and processing them with fantastic speed. It acts as the commander's intelligent, impartial adviser. That is how informative data is turned into control data, as a result of which the sum of objective data needed for decisionmaking is promptly formed.

Just what kind of computers are used in military affairs? For example, there are specialized computers intended for solving specific problems: calculating a trajectory, preparing initial data for firing, and so on. There also are general purpose machines capable of solving a wide range of problems. Computers are subdivided into analog machines and digital machines depending on the kind of signal carrying the data being output. Both types may be on-board or fixed.

We will obtain a more graphic idea of the computer on becoming familiar with the Soviet YeS-1060 digital general purpose machine. Its block diagram includes five devices fundamentally necessary for operation (by the way, like any other computer): data input, computing (processor), machine storage, control, and data output.

The principal part of the computer is the processor, which quickly and successfully solves the most complicated problems with the help of four arithmetic operations. The fact is that in preparing a program for the machine, complex mathematical equations are "broken down" into component parts and the solution in the end reduces to an operation with numbers--multiplication, division, addition, subtraction--and basic logic operations. That approach would appear to complicate obtaining an answer, but everything is compensated by the high speed and good accuracy of computations. By the way, speed is one of the most important characteristics of the computer. Applied to the YeS-1060 machine, this indicator stuns the imagination: it performs an average of approximately one million arithmetic operations per second! This is achieved by using fast counters.

Information theory has proven that any (even the most complicated!) communication can be represented and transmitted with the help of a combination of only two symbols--"0" and "1". There is a multitude of phenomena and devices in nature and engineering which possess two states: "day-night," "magnetized-demagnetized," "charged-discharged," "open-closed" and so on. Cyberneticists call the difference in two states a basic difference and adopt it as a unit of measurement: this is the bit, i.e., a binary "unit" of data, the unique "gram" of data. The computer is a cybernetic machine specifically intended for processing data represented in digital form.

For this reason specialists have given the machine lexicon just two words: "yes" and "no." Technically this is reflected extremely simply by "pulse" or "no pulse," which conforms to the two digits "0" or "1." At first glance it

seems that such a language is very meager; in practice, however, it turns out that the computer's capabilities are exceptionally great, but why? Well, because these ones and zeroes can be taken in a very great quantity and the most diverse signals can be combined from them. The YeS-1060 machine can operate with such figures having a "length" of 64 bits.

In just what way is the binary system implemented in the computer? We proceed from the very simplest method of displaying figures: if there is voltage on a certain component this is a "1," if there is no voltage it means a "0." A device which can receive, store and output signals corresponding to the "1" and "0" is called a flip-flop. It is noteworthy that the voltage pulse supplied to the flip-flop transforms it from one state to another. By passing from a "1" to a "0," the flip-flop itself puts out a voltage pulse.

Semiconductor devices with appropriate radio components are the flip-flop's basic elements. They are used in the circuits of amplifiers and various logic components. Their design execution is at a contemporary technological level. Here we won't see the transistors, condensers and so on in the form to which we are accustomed. The basic units of the YeS-1060 are made with semiconductor integrated microcircuits.

A compact computer called (not by chance) a "millionaire" was designed because of them. Suffice it to say that the capacity just of the YeS-1060's main storage reaches eight million bytes (eight megabytes). We will explain that one byte includes eight binary digits, i.e., it equals eight bits. Historically it turned out that it was more convenient for specialists to use bytes, since eight digits are enough to enter into them the 10 digits to which we are accustomed and any letter of the alphabet coded in binary system.

The YeS-1060 is completed with devices for inputting data of two types--from punched cards and punched tapes. If a hole is punched in the paper, the machine's electronic eye receives the symbol "1," and if there is no punched hole, that means a "0."

The computer's main storage was mentioned above. It sometimes is called internal storage, since it is built directly into the machine. Figuratively speaking, such storage is immediately "at hand" for the processor. The machine also can be made up of long-term or external storage racks, with data recorded on magnetic disks or tapes.

A control device should be taken to mean a set of special purpose instruments. For example, this includes the processor control console and the operator console of the YeS-1060 (an ordinary typewriter). Here, too, often is a display complex. Its screen displays the data being input and output in the form of letters and figures (the data also can be edited and documented).

Data also are input to an alphanumeric printer. It resembles a teletype set outwardly, and the principle of operation is similar--it prints out data on a wide paper tape at a rate of 120 characters per minute. Computer data also are displayed on punched cards or punched tape.

An advantage of the given computer lies in the fact that it can operate in a so-called multiprogram mode ("multum"--many), which increases its productivity and the flexibility of its use. After completing computations, the machine does not stop or await the input of the next program. Control is so advanced in the YeS-1060 that, for example, it can output results of the solution of one problem, solve a second problem and simultaneously receive a third. Other combinations also are possible.

There is no question that in the future computers will be improved and will find wide use in military affairs. But no matter what kind of control systems there may be, commands will not be automatically produced in them. Only the commander formulates commands. He will take advantage of the results of computer computations and recommendations, but the right to make the final decision will remain specifically with him.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

LT GEN LENGAROV ON FLIGHT SAFETY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 8 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Gavrilenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "With a Guarantee of Reliability"]

[Text] It seems that here, above the landing field, all the winds of this plain interrupted by rare copses came together. They squeeze tears from one's eyes and force one to hunch his shoulders in sensitivity. But Lt Gen Avn O. Lengarov, commander of aviation of the Order of Lenin Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District, does not notice these cold gusts as he accompanies each fighter taking off into the sky with his gaze all the way to the horizon. He is accustomed to it, it is an ordinary thing. Oleg Vladimirovich, in almost 40 years in aviation, mastered more than 20 types of aircraft and became a merited military pilot of the USSR. How many times he has had to accompany swift aircraft into the skies! Thus my first question arises!

Question. What do you think about during those several tens of seconds before the aircraft disappears from view?

Answer. Most of all about how the flight will enrich the pilot and what it will add to his aerial training. Invariably the thought also arises about his successful return to earth. You see, the seeming commonplace nature of flying at times hides from us the complexity and danger of each flight. Takeoff, landing, takeoff, landing... The impression is created that everything takes place of its own accord and that nothing can disrupt the established order. At times this causes self-complacency and some aviators begin to disdain that which lies at the foundation of flight safety. Meanwhile, in the hands of the pilot is most complex equipment, and beyond the windshield of the cockpit are tremendous speeds and altitudes from zero to the stratosphere. A flight requires skills, physical strength, a clear head and strong endurance. In short, every day and every hour as we engage in improving the flying, firing and tactical training of flight personnel, we also pay the closest attention to flight safety.

Question. Comrade General, one has occasion to hear from aviators: the less we fly the less preconditions there are for flying accidents...

Answer. You know, pilots are a jovial group, they are always joking, but let someone try without serious reasons to take them away from their flying for a day or two! You'll immediately see that they feel better in the air than on the ground. We have, of course, aviation commanders who live according to the principle "to be on the safe side." They even use any suitable reason to cancel a flight and expend much energy seeking such reasons instead of using it for careful organization and preparation of the flying day. I think that it is from them that the joke which you made reference to also arose. I am profoundly convinced that the modern approach to the life and service of aviators must be grounded on exactly the opposite principle: not a search for circumstances justifying overcautiousness, but a desire to use every suitable minute to improve the level of flight training.

Question. Oleg Vladimirovich, everyone is familiar with the phrase, "success in the air is forged on the ground." I suppose that the roots of flight safety also "go into the ground?"

Answer. That is entirely correct. How one prepares for a flight determines how it will take place. Flight regulations set forth in documents are strict, precise and unambiguous. They require from everyone who flies, maintains and supports flights, professional skill, technical confidence, and the strictest discipline, accuracy and responsiveness. Today more initiative and efficiency, and personal responsibility for the end results of the work of the subunits subordinate to them are required of command cadres. It is also necessary to comprehend critically our work of ensuring flight safety.

I am pleased, for example, with the organization of work in the unit where Lt Col S. Shmakov is serving. Here a well thought out system for organizing ground training has become a guarantee of flight safety. It includes thorough elucidation, as we say, with pencil in hand, of all the peculiarities of the mission on the ground, until firm habits are acquired in training classes and simulators. And only after this does flying begin. If we analyze the activity of a pilot from the time he receives his mission until takeoff, in its first half -- advance preparation -- the greater part of the time is allotted to the study of theory, and the lesser part to the simulators. On the day of preliminary training this is reversed. There is almost no paperwork, only sharing of experience and simulations -- plus continuous attention to standard of living, leisure time activities and sports. All of this creates a positive emotional frame of mind and safeguards against various types of psychological hitches which lead to accidents.

The experience of aviators in the subunits where Maj A. Glushenko is serving merits some complimentary words. We support their initiative to improve the forms and methods of preparing for and conducting flights. It seems to me that here one could find a successful combination of intense training and an effective regimen of rest.

Question. But, flight safety depends not only on the pilot...

Answer. Yes, it also depends on the specialists in the aviation engineering service, who are responsible, so to speak, for the "health" of the winged

vehicles. I can say a good word about the unit where V. Kalinin is serving. Here the ground specialists not only reliably prepare the military equipment for flights, but also make a significant contribution to the personal training of the pilots. In what way? By helping them comprehend the physical processes which are taking in the aircraft in all flight regimes. For example, there is a cockpit mockup in the training class. Each switch or lever which is turned on in it puts into operation a number of sequentially joined operating rigs. The entire dynamic of the operation of aircraft systems in the air can be observed. This is especially valuable in training pilots for operations under special conditions. The visual image is fixed in the memory of the individual and helps him operate under extreme flying conditions.

In short, a great deal depends on the active position and creative work of IAS [aviation engineer service] specialists. Omissions in their work also affect the actions of pilots.

Last winter I was present on several occasions when deputy squadron commanders for IAS were conducting briefings. I listened, and the reasons for some subsequent preconditions for flying accidents became clear. In the winter, understandably, the weather is not the best. There are declines in temperature, snow and rain. But these special features were far from fully considered. Here is what happened in one unit. After landing snow fell into the hot intake of the aircraft air pressure receiver. It melted and the water soon froze. Maj S. Sergiyenko, squadron engineer, did not take into account the nature of the weather, did not check the PVD [air pressure receiver] system and allowed an inoperable aircraft to take off. The instrument failed, luckily not resulting in a flying accident.

Question. One hears it said that preconditions for flying accidents are the lot of young pilots...

Answer. Don't say that... Here is a recent case. At one of the airfields an incident took place already during taxiing. Col V. Pavlenko, an experienced pilot, was at fault. He had developed, like some other experienced pilots, by the way, a syndrome of carelessness. Here the psychological boundary is very delicate. Some pilots, continuing to fly confidently and improve their abilities, also once in a while look backwards, to the time they were developing their skills, as if to guard themselves against self-complacency. Others do not trouble themselves with this and, thinking that they have "taken God by the beard" [thinking they are God] lose the ability to really assess their capabilities in a difficult situation.

Thus, Capt K. Cheboksarov, pilot 1st class and squadron commander, did not notice in time this self-complacency in his subordinate, Capt V. Gusko, military pilot 1st class. As a result, Gusko flagrantly violated the requirements of documents on one of his flights. We were forced to take the strictest measures of punishment: Gusko was eliminated from flying duties and Cheboksarov was removed from his position.

The high professionalism of a pilot is a multi-faceted concept. It is possible, "spoiling the initial applause" in his flying work, to easily

succumb to the illusion that success is guaranteed until the end of one's service, and to weaken one's demandingness toward himself. Very experienced pilots sometimes "stumble" on this.

Question. Is the concept of "openness" applicable to measures to improve flight safety?

Answer. Yes, it is applicable, and in exactly the sense in which the 27th CPSU Congress approved it. Accidents are far from everyday occurrences on our airfields. In many units there are no accidents for many long years. But every aviator must remember and know about them. And we struggle resolutely with efforts to conceal errors in work, clearly conscious of the fact that concealing them may be very costly to someone in the future. We strive to ensure that errors are not repeated and that any irregular situations, after they are analyzed and studied, lose their unexpectedness.

Analysis of any pre-condition is very instructive. For example, I frequently recall this episode. In one air regiment a crew returning from leave -- pilot and navigator -- were not informed about the completion in their absence of work on the system for affixing the life rafts to the life vests. And the documents were annotated that the pilots had been familiarized with this change. Literally a few days later the pilots had to abandon an aircraft for training purposes. Here a small snaphook, which snapped closed according to old memory in its former position, played its role. The boats were thrown aside so that the pilots could no longer reach them. It is not hard to imagine what might have happened had help not arrived on time...

The general looked at his watch. The time for the routine flights was coming to an end. Finishing the conversation, he said:

"There exists an entire complex of measures in the system for ensuring flight safety. And its foundation is the high discipline of the aviators, discipline in execution, technological discipline, thorough knowledge and strict fulfillment of the requirements of flight documents and military regulations."

..A strong wind sweeps the airfield. The planes come in to land one after another. Lt Gen Avn O. Lengarov suggests: "Let's go listen to the pilots..."

9069

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NAVAL FORCES

WESTERN SMALL CALIBER NAVAL ARTILLERY EXAMINED

Moscow VOYENNIYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 9 Dec 86) p 46

[Article based on foreign press materials by Capt 1st Rank (Res) I. Kosikov: "Small Caliber Ship Artillery"]

[Text] The present level of the NTR [scientific-technical revolution] has made substantial changes to the development of ship artillery. Initially nuclear weapons and soon thereafter missile technology in its first and most intensive phase of development shook the indisputable authority of guns and began to crowd them from ships. But the experience of tactical employment of fleets in numerous local wars unleashed by imperialists in the postwar period showed that it is too early to "decommission" guns "to shore"; they have not lost their importance and are capable of competing even with antiship missiles.

In the 1970's NATO countries began practical implementation of a vast program for rearming ships with new gun systems. The foreign press explains this as being for several reasons.

In comparison with close-range missiles, ship guns have a number of advantages: accuracy of fire, simplicity of design and tactical employment, constant combat readiness, operating reliability, and relatively low production cost. Moreover, it turned out in practice that the costly surface-to-air guided missile (ZURO) systems developed and placed in the inventory were not versatile. They proved effective against aircraft flying at high and medium altitudes, but they did not provide proper self-defense when firing against low-flying targets.

In addition, with the appearance of antiship missiles in the navies of a number of countries (usually with a low flight altitude and so with a low probability of destruction using surface-to-air guided missile systems) an examination of the problem of protecting ships from weapons operating at extremely low altitude assumed special significance. One way of solving the problem was to create [sozdaniye] and improve automatic ship guns (AKA) of small caliber (less than 76-mm), representing a compact system with a high rate of fire and high hit efficiency.

The reaction time, which is taken to mean the interval which passes from the issue of a target designation to the effect on a target of ammunition's lethal factors, is recognized as a very important characteristic. In contrast to conventional gun mounts, this is of special importance for a short-range system, since account must be taken of the functioning of electronic means of detection, target designation, identification and control and of the operator actions. The automation of small-caliber gun mounts led to the fact that reaction time did not exceed 10 seconds and this increased the competitiveness of automatic ship guns in comparison with the latest models of surface-to-air guided missiles.

The rather high indicators of the rates of fire of these gun mounts are the result of using fundamentally new technical solutions in modern gun systems: caseless ammunition, electric charge initiation and others.

Meanwhile, foreign specialists emphasize that over the last decade the range of automatic ship guns essentially has not increased. They believe, however, that for countering missiles, the intercept of such missiles at a range of a kilometer or even less is fully satisfactory, the more so as a target actually does not maneuver during the approach to a ship.

Capabilities of automatic ship guns are directly connected with an improvement in fire control systems. For example, while visual observation with the help of optical or television systems is sufficient for tracking low-flying missiles in hours of daylight, guidance is rather complicated under conditions of poor visibility, and a special radar is used for this. All contemporary ship gun systems also have subsystems which compensate for the effect of rolling and pitching motion and which take account of corrections for the meteorological situation.

The majority of small-caliber ship gun mounts are fitted with an automatic loading system, which permits opening immediate fire and conducting it without the participation of personnel, including even reloading.

The Swedish Bofors and Italian Breda-Compact gun mounts have become widespread in NATO naval forces. The basic tactical and technical characteristics of the gun mounts are in the table.

Tactical-Technical Characteristics	Gun Mounts		
	SAK 57L-70 Bofors	Breda-Compact	Mk-15 Vulcan-Phalanx
Caliber, mm	57	40	20
Barrel length, caliber	70	70	76
Number of barrels	1	2	6
Number of rounds in magazines	40	736 (444)	950
Range of fire, km:			

Horizontal	14	12.5	3
Vertical	8	8.7	-
Laying rate, degrees/seconds:			
Horizontal	55	90	-
Vertical	40	90	-
Rate of fire, rounds/min	200	600	3,000

The Swedish automatic ship gun is intended for engaging airborne and surface targets. It uses fragmentation-HE rounds of several types with time or impact fuze. A round with a radio fuze has been developed for countering antiship missiles; it has a reaction radius of 5 m at a height of 40 m or more, which reduces to a meter at a height of 5 m.

The Breda-Compact antiaircraft automatic ship gun is similar to the Bofors in a number of characteristics, but is produced in two versions differing in magazine capacity. Fragmentation-HE rounds fitted with radio fuzes also are used for firing. In addition to the gun mount, the system includes a fire control radar, computer and control console.

In the opinion of foreign specialists, it is possible to improve fire effectiveness by using proximity fuzes, by increasing the projectile's casualty-producing factors, and also by employing multibarrel guns. This explains in particular the appearance of six-barrel systems which are more economical and have an increased hit probability.

These include the American 20-mm gun mount created [sozdannaya] on the basis of the Vulcan aircraft cannon in which a unit of six barrels which rotates about a longitudinal axis from an electric drive. The operation of parallel reloading of each barrel after each round is rather simple and reliable.

The Vulcan-Phalanx close-in weapon system (American production) is intended for countering low-flying and diving antiship missiles as well as small surface targets. In addition to the gun, the system includes two radars which provide autonomous search, detection, lock-on and tracking of targets; and a control panel. The system provides high accuracy of fire. Modular design permits its installation relatively easily aboard ships of various types.

Holland is arming frigates with an American 30-mm gun mount which is part of a new gun system of its own production. A British single-barrel mount has been created [sozdana] on the basis of the series-produced 30-mm gun of the British Army's reconnaissance vehicles. In short, the new small-caliber gun mounts are being developed [razrabatyvatsya] and improved jointly and in parallel by a number of NATO countries.

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NAVAL FORCES

ADMIRAL KHRONOPULO INTERVIEWED ON RESTRUCTURING IN BALTIC FLEET

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 87 p 2

[Unsigned Article: "Military Training: Acceleration Reserves -- The Effect of a Systematic Approach"]

[Text] Ships accomplishing the missions of long range voyages are one of the main concerns of the navy command. An intensive process of building up the military skill of naval personnel takes place under the conditions of a lengthy voyage, which is filled with both planned military training tasks and those dictated by the situation. Here takes place a thorough test of the effectiveness of shore training of crews, the tactical ability of ship commanders and the capability of staffs to develop and master the methods of improving military training in the dynamics of life.

The forward edge of restructuring in the navy seems to be at sea. It is namely at sea that Capt 1st Rank S. Bystrov, our correspondent, requested that Adm M. Khronopulo, Black Sea Fleet commander, discuss how restructuring in the fleet is coming along, what problems it is posing and how prepared the fleet is to solve them.

Question. Comrade Admiral, apparently each of your visits to ships is associated with assessing the activity of task forces and rendering flag officers and staffs specific assistance. What task are you posing to yourself on this trip?

Answer. The last time that I, along with a group of officers from the staff and political administration, visited this task force, for example, was several months ago. Our task was not only to ascertain the true state of combat readiness of the ships, but also to assist in the search for new reserves to improve the effectiveness of military training. Now we have the opportunity to check what has been done in this area, how energetically the changes noted by the fleet command are being implemented, what practical difficulties are arising, how it is proposed that they be overcome, and finally, what self evaluation of the work is being made.

Question. What opinion have you arrived at about the activity of the command, staff and task force as a whole?

Answer. If we approach the matter from the standpoint of previous evaluations the ships are successfully dealing with their assigned missions and, seemingly, this is good. But, as soon as we touched on prospects for real acceleration; i.e., improving the effectiveness, output and results of military training, certain difficulties arose. At least with respect to Capt 1st Rank M. Kulak. He is a capable, diligent and conscientious officer, but he does not always see the most important directions of his work behind the layer of everyday matters. And without this there is no restructuring.

Here today, on the ground, I again assured myself that the number of auxiliary forces in the task force clearly exceeds the optimum. This completely suits the staffs; it is easier to solve support missions. But, easier is not always better. We must struggle not merely for effectiveness of military training, but also for economy. This means that the staff must maintain the optimum number of support resources and seek ways to use them most effectively. accomplishing such a mission, once it is posed to the staff -- that is real restructuring indeed.

Question. Perhaps, some officials simply do not understand precisely what specific requirements are placed on them during the course of restructuring, and perhaps these requirements are not reaching them and they themselves lack the necessary initiative and creative activeness?

Answer. I believe that it is more necessary here to talk about the fact that not all officials have yet adopted as their positions the well known demands of the fleet command. Personally I do not conceal my own concepts. Moreover, I strive to ensure that they are understood and adopted by everyone in the fleet. Only in this case does the commander acquire the true capability of really implementing the planned policy.

In what do I see this? First of all in the restructuring of consciousness and development of the firm conviction that it is necessary to work more responsibly and fulfill ones duty fully and conscientiously. In this regard, one is to consider it his duty to search for unused reserves, which would ensure the progressive development of the capabilities of the fleet to improve combat readiness.

We saw in practice that improvement in the style of our work is opening up great reserves of acceleration. First of all, this concerns its planned nature in all directions, always distinguishing the main direction. Restructuring is implemented by people. This means that its effectiveness depends most of all on the quality of cadres. Military training -- the main sphere of "production" of the navy -- requires more competent and scientific, I would say, systematization. In doing this it is necessary to increase the role of regulations in every thing and in every way.

Question. What aspect of the activity of the fleet, in your view, deriving from precise planning of the work, requires priority attention, if in this case one can talk about priorities at all?

Answer. The ability to distinguish the main element has always played a most important role for us communists in solving any problem. Today the priority task of the fleet command is professional training of commanders at all levels.

If one looks attentively one finds that as some officers rise in position they reduce their demandingness about their own training. The higher a commander's rank, the more purposeful he must be and the greater degree of perfection he must achieve in organizing and planning his activity.

I have stated my position repeatedly on raising the demands made upon the training of commanders of all ranks, in the military soviet, at meetings and in personal conversations with almost all of the task force commanders and chiefs of political organs. And everyone always agreed enthusiastically with me. Comrade commander, they would say, no one ever explained this to us so intelligently, we understand everything, everything will be accomplished... but in practice it turns out otherwise. The very first checks showed this. Far from all task force commanders are fulfilling our requirements themselves, and they are not hastening to issue them, even to their own staffs. It was necessary to establish firm control. We checked the deputy task force commanders and chiefs of staff. Then the ship commanders. The results were not always comforting. Behind this is the desire to stay within the old familiar framework of activity, which does not require additional efforts.

Question. And, no doubt, these leaders, each at his own station, spare no words in calling for restructuring. To restructuring in general, which does not burden his appeals in a specific sense?

Answer. And what specific meaning can a man apply if he himself has not yet understood what restructuring is for him. These are replaced by discussions, superficial fuss and searching everywhere for everything new, but so that nothing is changed essentially. And it is bad if the designation restructuring is taken in some places as real action. Therefore, the role of party organizations in assessing the processes taking place in subunits, on ships and in units must increase continuously. Everyone who tries to throw sand in the eyes of the people in places where a fundamental change in our attitude toward work is underway must be given a decisive, principled assessment. Here we are placing great hopes on the political organs, which must render all measure of support to communists, who are striving to act according to their consciences and evaluate themselves and others.

Question. How are things going now with confirming the system of improving the professional training of task force, unit and ship commanders? Will a practical improvement be achieved just the same?

Answer. The effectiveness of our appeals and explanations has turned out to be low. But, obviously, there was no reason here to labor under excessive delusions. The restructuring of consciousness is a complex matter and not everything here can be taken by storm. Persistence, consistency and firmness are needed. I see a need now to "break through" stagnate layers, where they exist, and bring my demands to the commanders of ships and subunits. I myself

am constantly involved in this personally. You may think that as fleet commander I am taking on others' functions. No, for it is most important now to achieve conformity of opinions in the fleet and a general conviction of the need for a drastic change in the situation -- a change in the training of ship commanders, in the struggle for safety and in the strengthening of military discipline.

Of course, words here are not enough, effective organizational measures are needed. At present, for example, in the fleet task forces officers are confirming authorizations for independent ship commands. Task force commanders are checking the preparedness of ship commanders. Then the fleet will check the commanders. I have stated for all to hear that we will mercilessly remove the authorizations of unprepared commanders. Here there can be no compromises. And if task force and ship commanders firmly assimilate this, it can be considered that yet another step has been taken in the fleet's restructuring plan.

Question. The problem of the arising shortage of excellently trained ship commanders, apparently, is no exception for the Black Sea Fleet? Will not such harsh measures exacerbate the situation?

Answer. Of course we have to confront such difficulties. Let us say that at times we cannot remove from his position a commander who does not justify our hopes, because, as it is reported from local areas, there is no replacement for him. But the fact that there is no replacement is not because the fleet has grown short of talented officers. The fact is, as we have ascertained, that the system for training deputies does not exist or is not in full operation everywhere. So this problem is not as difficult as it seems. There are talented people in the fleet, but we do not always know them. At the same time, officers recommended for commanders' positions do not always meet the demands placed upon them, and we blindly trust in paperwork. As a result, unforgivable lapses are permitted.

Say that here the task force command and cadre organ recommended Capt 3d Rank V. Yemelyanov to us as an excellent officer for the position of submarine commander. And soon after he was assigned it was necessary to remove him from his position. It became clear, by the way, that prior to his assignment he had received party punishment for personal shortcomings, which subsequently became aggravated.

Now we are checking candidates for the positions of commanders of first and second rank ships at the level of the military soviet members. And at the same time we are taking active steps to seek worthy replacements for the lists of candidates, and intend to introduce a fleet-wide system of selection, training and indoctrination of future ship commanders, beginning with lieutenants.

Question. Comrade Admiral, as is known, the Black Sea Fleet was not able to achieve high results in all areas during the past training year. How do you assess this?

Answer. We are still not working well. But changes for the better are maturing. Only in words is reconstruction easy. In practice, behind it is hard, persistent and patient work. Haste and a desire to force the pace of the results and maintain the appearance that all is well through various "quick acting injections," these are also merely marks of restructuring and the creation of its appearance. The effect of a systematic approach is not always rapid, but is stable. I believe that our efforts in this training year will bring more tangible results.

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NAVAL FORCES

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF 'AUTHORITY OF SEAGOING PERSONNEL'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 10 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Capt Lt Ye. Ioffe, assistant chief, Naval Force EMS [expansion unknown]: "Through the Entire Incentive System"]

[Text] The uniform of naval personnel is beautiful: the luster of gold shoulder boards and stripes, which reflect as in a mirror the victories of the Russian and Soviet navy and the glorious deeds of naval personnel in our day. A young lieutenant finishing naval school receives shoulder boards automatically, although he does not always go to a ship. And today, more and more often, not all strive to be assigned to a ship, but each is quite willing to wear the marks of distinction of seagoing personnel. So it occurred to me that since there are distinctions in the uniforms of naval personnel, these distinctions should work. Perhaps it would be appropriate to award sleeve stripes ceremoniously on VMS [Soviet Navy] warships and other vessels after lieutenants have passed their exams authorizing them to command their subunit independently; operate their areas of management and stand underway watch. After all, gold is awarded for merit. This will create a moral incentive for young officers to master the equipment entrusted to them.

Ship duty is difficult, but honorable. And it is a pity that the honor is not increased, even formally, for the length of this service. Previously, for lengthy shipboard or flying service military personnel were awarded orders, for not everyone is able to accomplish a "one-time feat" in peacetime and protracted, irreproachable service by naval personnel taking part in lengthy voyages and by pilots is also a kind of feat, which requires skill, courage, very intense efforts and readiness for self-sacrifice.

I think that the whole service environment and system of incentives should encourage people's desire to merit the honor. I support the proposals already made in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that naval ranks and marks of distinction be worn by officers on ship duty and those who have served as seagoing personnel no less than five to seven years, and that officers and warrant officers having behind them many distant voyages be honored with state awards in first priority. Naturally, in all this we must not forget about navy doctors and pilots who take part in long ship voyages.

The article by Capt 3d Rank V. Gerzhov, "The Authority of Seagoing Personnel," of 12 Feb 86 expressed the desire to return to the old medal, "For a Distant Voyage." All of my comrades are of the same opinion, but believe that it would be advisable to add a removable pendant with an indication of the number of long range voyages. Such an award should be made for sailing as a crew member on a warship, support vessel or submarine. And all participants in cadet training voyages should be awarded the now existing medal, "For a Distant Voyage."

However, it also happens that a sailor is at sea all the time and in his whole life only has one or two distant voyages. This especially concerns small ships. Therefore, it makes sense, as a general measure of the work of naval personnel, to take into account the time at sea of each and also note it in a definite way. Then the piece of paper which indicates time at sea in personnel records will not be merely a formality.

Now I would like to say a few words about professional training. As we know, material incentives for officers for class qualifications are not provided in the Navy. An officer's class qualification gives him only a feeling of personal satisfaction and a badge, a badge on which a tank with a missile and lightning bolts are depicted. This badge is not frequently seen on VMS seagoing officers. This is not because there are few class specialists, but because it includes no naval attributes. One does not see pilots without class qualification badges. They have their own specific distinction for aviation.

But, it seems to me, that besides outer marks of distinction it is now time to think also about the question of material incentives for specialized training of officers. For without this we will not achieve substantial advances in increasing technical knowledge in the Navy. And there is also something to learn from pilots in the area of material incentives.

In order to be called a sailor it is necessary to go to sea continuously, or, at least, sail for some period of time. It sometimes happens, though, that an officer has barely served on a ship, and as a senior lieutenant or having just become a captain lieutenant, leaves for headquarters, school or military reception station. And that's it. There is nothing to entice him back to sea duty. And naval specialties on shore also require modernization of skills. The participation of officers from schools, academies and NII [scientific research institutes] in shipboard tours shows that they in such a short period of time they do not succeed in acquiring direct knowledge in the field of activity of seagoing officers and in working with the personnel. The authority of instructors and inspectors is determined most of all by their real practical knowledge in the operation of modern equipment. This information is not obtained without direct, independent fulfillment of duties at sea, and for a sufficiently long period of time. Such skills of naval service will not be found in officers who work continuously in the quiet of Leningrad and Moscow offices, and brief familiarization trips are of no benefit. And, it is not for nothing that previously in our navy there existed a statute about sea qualification. It encouraged all officers to have full-fledged ship duty, and not for the entry in the officer's biographical record as sometimes happens now.

Apropos of this, the statutory return of officers after a period of shore duty to sea duty would greatly simplify some cadre problems and serve to raise the qualifications of shipboard officers as a whole. An end would also be put to the protectionism which sometimes exists now, owing to which some young officers very quickly end up in a good city, in a quiet duty position.

Naturally, shipboard officers are circumspect when speaking about benefits to themselves. On the one hand, they seem to be ashamed, (selfless officers serve on ships), and on the other, practice has shown that it is futile. Take, for example, questions of quarters, kindergartens, work for wives and distribution of goods that are in short supply. Very frequently seagoing personnel find themselves in a disadvantageous position in this regard. And, you see, merely verbal authority is not really authority. Here even a small, but concrete advantage requires many loud words.

I will touch upon one or two things. Even in purely military garrisons our seagoing personnel do not enjoy the right to acquire tickets for movies, the theater or concerts on a priority basis. When instances of drunkenness are investigated it is often found that one of the reasons for the drinking was a lack of opportunity to find diversions other than the bar. It is hard to get to a movie, theater or concert on Sundays. This is even more the case as it is difficult to plan in advance. Thus a wife, fiancée or girlfriend, although she may want to, cannot acquire tickets in advance. By comparison I note that seamen from the Ministry of the Fish Industry and the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet are able to get reserved tickets in coastal cities. There is no doubt that seeing movies, plays and exhibits together will also be beneficial to the families of military naval personnel.

Of course my suggestions, like the other partial suggestions of previous authors, cannot solve the problem of the authority of seagoing personnel being discussed on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But I would like to believe that they will have an effect on its solution. Our time, a time of concrete actions, raises this hope.

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NAVAL FORCES

REAR ADM DENISOV ON NORTHERN FLEET REAR SERVICES PROBLEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 9 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm V. Denisov, Northern Fleet chief of rear services and deputy fleet commander for rear services: "Northern Variant -- Rear Services Support of the Fleet"]

[Text] Northerners know that it is a rare winter beyond the Polar Circle that goes by without unexpected unpleasanties. Recently a mooring buoy was torn off from the place of anchorage of a cruiser on one of its trips by hurricane-force winds. At any other time of year it most likely would not have been so difficult to find it and set it back up again. But now, when blasts of snow followed one after another, it was necessary to equip an entire naval expedition, consisting of several ships and subunits from fleet rear services, for operations on the roadstead.

Yes, with the onset of winter colds and Polar nights rear support of ships and units becomes much more difficult. Therefore, the best way of avoiding additional difficulties here is to work with maximum effort and anticipate everything back during the preparatory period, long before the first frost. It is known, for example, that the main type of transport in the Polar Region is naval transport; i.e., it is especially dependent on climatic conditions. It is no exception when a tanker or other support ship, instead of the planned one or two days is detained for delivery of goods for a week or more due to poor weather. Something similar has already happened this winter, however, overall it has now been possible to alleviate somewhat the acuteness of the problem of delivery. Most of all this is due to the fact that so called no-pier deliveries of goods -- to lighthouses, roadstead posts, remote garrisons and other places lacking special equipment to receive ships -- were accomplished this season earlier than usual, and without any losses.

Moreover, comprehensive delivery of goods acquitted itself well under harsh weather conditions. This is when one ship delivers simultaneously clothing, food products, medicines and other winter supplies. After all, navigation to some points may suddenly be closed for long months, and therefore, while the situation allows, it is necessary to deliver everything right away, getting by with fewer trips.

But, if the fleet rear services had to surmount only difficulties caused exclusively by natural phenomena, this would be, as it is said, a half victory. As experience shows, frequently the "pranks of Mother Winter" cannot be compared with other manifestations of irresponsibility and poor management on the part of some officials. Here is graphic confirmation of this. To the present time we cannot achieve a more rhythmic delivery of fuel from the bases in winter. Some places it is entirely lacking, and at other places it flows literally in a river. And there are instances when tankers are laid up in good weather, since trains with fuel did not arrive, and in poor weather they have to either deliver the fuel to their destinations just the same, displaying miracles of resourcefulness, or... again wait, standing with full tanks at the piers.

The hard to explain unwillingness of some ship commanders to replenish the minimum permitted material supplies in a timely manner, i.e., immediately upon returning from sea, also does not have the best effect on the work of rear services. Then, when this ship must urgently go to sea, turmoil begins, which disorganizes the work at many levels.

And on top of that, you look around, the wind picks up, the snow falls and the tanker or barge cannot approach the side of the ship. Then it is necessary, yet again, to set hopes on the reliability and resourcefulness of the support ship crews -- such crews as those of the tankers Kola, Klyazma, Dubna, Prut and many seagoing and harbor tugs. At times these ships and small craft are covered with ice to the tops of their masts, but when necessary do not take up a berth for days on end. Giving their due to the selflessness of sailors from the auxiliary fleet, we will, however, remember often still the real heroism of some is the result of the low level of professionalism and laxity of others.

Let us take, say, the serious problem which is never solved year after year of excessive idle time of ships while offloading.

For example, in the large unit of submarines where officer V. Krylov is serving, dozens of supposedly objective reasons are given to explain the idle periods. But here is what is curious. When ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet stand idle this threatens the consignee with heavy fines, and he is forced willy nilly to seek out not "objective causes," but more effective methods of loading and offloading. But in case of idle time of military transports and tankers such sanctions are not provided for. And this is a pity, it seems to me. Economic methods of influence have in many situations recommended themselves in practice much more effectively than administrative methods.

For the units and subunits of Northern Fleet Rear Services the acceleration, which we are all living today is a truly literal task -- to deliver and offload goods more quickly and to prepare and train to do something in a compressed amount of time. But are our needs and our specific jobs always being taken into account at the higher levels?

Thus, it is a good thing that we are supported by a sufficient quantity of large-load containers. Deliveries in them are considered most progressive.

However, alas, the containers have still not received the necessary dissemination. At fault in this is a damnable triviality. There are many 15 and 20 ton containers, but there is a lack of special means to process them. And at times it is necessary to use the heavy-load containers as... supply stores. But is this in the interests of the state?

With the arrival of winter the need of the fleet for small tankers, as most removable and mobile, is increasing. However, overall tonnage is being provided mainly through the use of large vessels, and it is not always advisable, and at times it is simply impossible, to operate them in poor weather. Approximately the same situation has also taken shape with respect to the harbor tugs. In the summer their shortage is not so noticeable. But, let us say, in order to dock a cruiser in the winter several tugs are required. And what if there are several large ships in the harbor? In this regard I will make this comparison. In 1942 there were more tugs for warships in the Northern Fleet than there are today.

Besides everything else, the failure to solve large problems affects the attitudes of people toward the problems which they themselves are responsible for solving.

Some supervisors, including economic managers, use winter as a weighty argument, which explains still existing omissions in the materiel supply of ships and naval units. The seduction and temptation to attribute personal shortcomings to the caprices of the weather are still great in some people. Such an attitude toward work cannot be tolerated.

The natural and, probably, only way to combat difficulties of a subjective and human nature is to raise demandingness and make control more strict. Such work is being carried out, and more and more effectively.

Today, when the question of increasing the importance of the human factor and creating normal conditions for the economic activity and rest of working people are especially high on the agenda, we cannot close our eyes either to the clearly incompletely thought out situation concerning overtime work of support ship crews. According to existing legislation, we do not have the authority to pay for their additional work on days off. It is often not possible to grant a worker a day off on a work day as compensation, as is provided for. And it turns out that in the auxiliary fleet as a whole by the end of winter (since it is winter that the crews most often work overtime) thousands of unrealized free days "fly away." What can we do about them?

To some extent a way out of this situation, in our view, might be to introduce six day work weeks on support ships. This, by the way, would be in the mutual interests of both the fleet and the crews. The creation of reserves to supplement crews would also answer the problem of strengthening cadres, and increasing the duration of continuous operation of tankers, transports and other ships. I understand that this all sounds new and unusual. But, restructuring in questions of manning, it seems to me, is just as urgent a need as in all other questions associated with improving the activity of fleet rear services.

We are not talking here about creating some kind of special conditions for northern workers. It should be considered that all of the problems about which we spoke are not so much "northern" in their specific nature, as they reflect our common needs for more precise and harmonious work, for eliminating interference from bureaucratic barriers and the reducing of some aspects of our activity to "trivialities." It is another matter that, perhaps, beyond the Polar Circle all of this is felt more keenly, for there as nowhere else, I believe, services are close to and touch the lives of everyone. This means that here more active efforts must be made to clear the way for everything new.

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NAVAL FORCES

QUALITY OF NAVAL TRAINING CRITIQUED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 2, February 1987 pp 6-7

[Article by Capt 2d Rank G. Ivashkin, ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent: "Why Did the Torpedo Sink?"]

[Text] I will acknowledge at the outset that cases like this one have taken place in various subunits and at various times. But they are similar in their overall results.

When, following an intense search, the sonars picked up engines amidst the customary sea noises, the most decisive minute came.

The movement of a ship into a torpedo attack is a crucial moment. It sums up many days of work on the part of the entire crew. The sonars functioned efficiently and surely; the crew at the combat information station worked precisely; the navigator ably determined the elements of target movement, and the torpedo electrician also did his job. The torpedomen had the last word. They also reported their readiness to the commander. The brief command "Away!" was given and the torpedos left the submarine.

The result was unexpected by the crew. No one observed one of the torpedos to the target ship. Nor was it possible to observe it surfacing after it had run its intended distance. Hope for success in the searches dissipated when the torpedo section commander, Sr Seaman V. Konyayev, found the plug from the torpedo battery section vent in his pocket. It became clear. The torpedo did not reach the target; it lost its air tightness and sank.

This was an extreme occurrence, and many wondered how it could happen.

"I put the plug in my pocket so as not to lose it," explained the senior seaman. "Later I forgot about it."

"Had the plug been in view" Konyayev would not have forgotten to put it back," stated the department commander contritely. It was an accident."

So it was considered in the subunit. However, the results of the investigation revealed the true reasons for this "accident." How had Sr Seaman V. Konyayev been acting? It is not enough that he had a poor

understanding of the sequence for fulfilling operations, but, knowing about the time the work was to begin, he did not carry out the appropriate preparation. The vent manifold and hoses were readied hastily, on the move. It is not surprising that the manifold was put in place only on the second attempt and that the department commander had to connect the hoses. This caused nervous tension and bustle. The crew hastily closed the large hand hole of the torpedo without making sure that the plug had been placed in the battery section vent. Nor did the department commander check this.

Why do such things happen? One of the reasons is known -- inadequate training on the part of some specialists. But there are also other factors.

Remember that Konyayev and his coworkers were given enough time to ready the weapon. Did the torpedo operators use this time fruitfully? Of course not. Otherwise they would not have been diverted searching for a needed tool. Why did the sailors violate established regulations and display carelessness? It was because in the subunit the men became used to not following regulations and to violating the requirements of instructions. Until the last day, for example, disregarding existing regulations, the former petty officer of the crew was located in the first compartment during the preparations for and conduct of firing. Did he help the section chief? No, he did not help, but he took over for Konyayev. After this can we speak about firm skills and knowledge of the torpedomen?

It is understandable why the department commander became vexed, but could he really not have seen the poor training of the senior seaman and some of his subordinates? He saw. But he did not take steps to help the crew eliminate gaps in their knowledge. Moreover, he himself did not become an example of high responsiveness and demandingness. Had he monitored the work of the senior seaman this vexing incident would not have occurred. And monitoring is strictly regulated by the instructions.

Thus, how can we talk about an accident? The torpedo sank because of a violation of instructions, lack of responsiveness and the low level of training on the part of the submarine torpedo operators.

Does this mean that it is enough to increase the demands placed upon them and solve the problem of their level of training and the success of the torpedo attack will be ensured? At first glance this should be the case. But, after all, the torpedos are delivered from shore and there are people who are responsible for their preparation. The navy saying, "Success at sea is forged on shore," is nowhere more appropriate than with respect to the organization of torpedo firing. The torpedo's movement for its full range and its accuracy also depend on the shore torpedo crews.

I recall this instance. Having arrived at its assigned sector, the torpedo recovery boat crew detected damage to one of the torpedos. The registration instruments showed that a short circuit had occurred during the torpedo run. This was due to incorrect assembly of the battery by the shore torpedo crew in which Warrant Officer V. Zholtser was the petty officer. In short, here also one of the torpedos did not reach its target.

Having visited various units and met with sailors, warrant officers and officers, I am convinced that there truly are problems with the shore torpedo crews. Warrant Officer P. Golub, a master of his military skill, discussed some of them:

"I am convinced that it is necessary to bring order to the organization of work details; too often torpedo crew specialists are diverted to various projects. It has already become almost systemic. As soon as preparation of a torpedo begins an order follows requiring one or two men for a detail. Then it is necessary to resort to replacements. But rarely are any of them of equal ability. A new man requires time to become acclimated and get into the working rhythm of the collective. As a result, the likelihood of errors increases.

By the way, the specialists calculated that more than half of all cases of defective functioning (any deviation of a product from its assigned direction) took place after crew members were diverted from preparation of the weapons. And there are corresponding documents which state clearly that such practice is harmful.

The situation is aggravated also by the fact that some crews have heavy work loads. For example, the crew of Warrant Officer Golub prepares several models of weapons. At times the men do not leave the shop for long periods of time and work until they are worn out. Of course, the warrant officer's subordinates are experienced and knowledgeable specialists, but who can guarantee that a mistake will not occur. The crew chief cannot. Good luck can't last forever.

I must also mention the working conditions of the shore torpedo crews. I have visited in the shops. Here I agree with Warrant Officer Golub and the other comrades. It is difficult to fit the necessary equipment into the facilities. Moreover, humidity requirements are not adhered to, which substantially affects the quality of torpedo preparation. The impression exists that the people who work here are remembered only when an accident happens.

One important thing is the need to reinforce the ranks of warrant officers in the crews. In the unit where Golub serves there are fewer warrant officers each year. I believe one reason is that the role of crew chief has been somewhat denigrated. Everyone familiar with the nature of the warrant officer's work knows that it is difficult and very crucial. But his wage category is lower than that of other shore specialists who have less work to do. Of course, this is not the decisive matter. And they understand this fact well in the unit. But, it is also not right to omit it from the overall problem of reinforcing the ranks of the specialists.

The question of skill training deserves special discussion. There are many opportunities for raising the level of specialist training. Regular lessons, training, instruction and independent study all enable the personnel to improve their knowledge continuously and be up to date with technical innovations. But, practice shows that not all these opportunities are fully used. Shore torpedo crews should pay more attention to theoretical training. Working with the weapons continuously they become, as a rule, good

practitioners. At the same time, they do not have time for some theoretical questions. This means that it is necessary to plan training so that study of theory is combined with practical assimilation of the material.

A somewhat different approach to study is proposed for the training of submarine torpedomen. Obviously, lessons should be structured according to the principle of ship combat crew exercises, in which training questions are worked out by all crew members operating together. Such experience justifies itself. It enables the torpedomen to acquire firm practical skills.

The question of training the torpedo petty officer is also an important one. They are commanders and must know how to instruct. This they must be taught. Petty officers have to organize lessons capably and observe technical safety measures. A series of conferences and technical evening meetings to share experience might be held. This will help improve the organization and quality of specialist training.

As concerns working conditions, existing reserves should probably be examined. For example, in the unit where Golub is serving, they were able to warm the building. Of course, this was not easy, but they did it, they found a solution. As a result humidity was reduced to normal levels. Obviously, it is also necessary to think about more effective arrangement of the equipment.

The struggle to make each shot count entails the unconditional fulfillment of appropriate orders, which prohibit the use of personnel associated with weapons preparation on any projects, duty tours and watches. Not only commanders, but also political workers and party organizations must strictly monitor this matter.

Heightened demands are made today. A new approach to solving urgent problems is required on ships and in units, and at higher levels of the navy, and it is necessary to seek unusual solutions and be prepared to take on responsibility. All of this presumes truly active work. Then weapons will be serviced still better and the effectiveness of their combat employment will also improve.

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NAVAL FORCES

REPORTAGE FROM ON BOARD 'NOVOROSSIYSK'

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Feb 87 p 6

[Article by N. Dombkovskiy, special correspondent: "Patrol Route -- Reportage From On Board an Aircraft Carrier Cruiser"]

[Text] It is a fantastic sight! Resting on a column of fire and streams of red hot gases, the short-winged aircraft, which just darted over the ship like a bullet, stops in the air and begins to descend slowly to the deck. The streams of bubbling air reflected from the heat resistant surface make the silhouette of the aircraft shake as though it were very rapidly flapping its wings, resembling in these seconds a gigantic metal wasp.

Very recently there were not so many vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. However, new materials and new technologies enabled one of our oldest design bureaus to create this formidable combat vehicle. And immediately the situation changed. The navy received a reliable defensive weapon and the aircraft carrier cruisers created based on it became a powerful warning to a potential aggressor.

Brief commands rang out, the gigantic ship slowly pulled out of the bay and, gathering speed, moved out to sea. In these minutes a small break appeared in the list of endless concerns of the commander and I was able to talk with him.

Capt 1st Rank Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Litvinenko, commander of the aircraft carrier cruiser Novorossiysk, is not yet forty. He was born far from the sea in the Transbaykal area, but dreamed about the Pacific Ocean from his childhood. Namely about the ocean. Stubbornness and persistence led him finally to the bridge of a modern ship. It was here also that the commander's talent of Litvinenko developed. The Novorossiysk is invariably among the leaders in socialist competition and Yevgeniy Yakovlevich represented the communists of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet at the 27th CPSU Congress.

Along with him in the work of the congress took part his friend of the same age and colleague in the service, Hero of the Soviet Union Col Yuriy Ivanovich Churilov, the air regiment commander.

According to tradition an inspection of the cruisers begins with the "rooms of glory." Every sailor and petty officer before taking his place at the

machines and mechanisms is acquainted with the history of the Novorossiysk. Behind it are thousands of miles of long ocean voyages. For its successes in military training and exemplary fulfillment of the missions of the command, many sailors and officers have been awarded state awards and the ship itself was awarded the banners of the VLKSM [Komsomol] Central Committee and Party Kraykom.

No doubt several weeks would be required merely to look all around the Novorossiysk if one visited each of its rooms or cabins even for a minute. The battle stations and crew compartments, wardrooms and machine sections, hangers and garages are interconnected by innumerable ladders, passage ways and corridors, in which the uninitiated will immediately get lost. Therefore, naturally, one does not walk around without a guide. We took our trip together with 30-year old Capt 3d Rank Sergey Mikhaylovich Yevlanchik, deputy commander of the Novorossiysk for political affairs. The ship is literally a floating island, where there is absolutely everything necessary for long months of autonomous existence.

In the domestic shops Petty Officer 2d Class S. Arshakyan was engaged in tailoring, ship's barber Seaman N. Askerov was cutting hair, and sailors M. Khurtsilava and K. Dzhumabekov had baked uncommonly tasty bread.

The ship's infirmary could amaze any doctor. There were a dental office, operating and therapeutic apparatuses, and mechanical training devices for restoring muscular strength. I saw instruments for electrical acupuncture, shown to me by an acupuncturist doctor whose position was included in the ship's infirmary table of organization.

A strong shore wind, even here far at sea, broke the crest of waves into clumps and chased a group of battered ice floes. The ocean swell struck at an angle against the stem of the cruiser, but no rolling at all was felt. The size of the ship and special stabilizers in its underwater part neutralized the water's attack.

In the internal compartments, which were air conditioned, the bad weather and high speeds could not be felt at all. In the sports hall a group of sailors were working with weights and on a cross bar. Officers who recently went off shift swam in the swimming pool following a sauna. The local television studio transmitted on two channels -- a color television program and feature films.

In the quiet hum of thousands of operating mechanisms suddenly were interspersed the sounds of electrical musical instruments. It turned out that the ship's ensemble was preparing a new program for 23 February. They were going to perform not only on the Novorossiysk, but also for senior officials on shore.

We walked about the ship for a long time. For a civilian who had long completed his military service it was especially noticeable how far the equipment had come. Young energetic officers with higher education were controlling it. And many of the sailors came to the navy with serious knowledge behind their belts.

I was already taking leave of the hospitable cruiser when telegrams arrived at its mail section from Novorossiysk, the city whose name it bears and with which its crew is on friendly terms. The city authorities congratulated the personnel on Soviet Army and Navy Day, and friends and relatives sent greetings to Novorossiysk native Lt Leonid Sobolev and sailors Sergey Gorelenko and Andrey Dmitriyenko, who had come to the Novorossiysk on komsomol passes.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

CONSTRUCTION TROOPS RETAINED AFTER RETIREMENT DATE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan 87 p 2

[Unsigned Article: "False Agreements"]

[Text] It all began with a telephone call to the editors.

"This is military construction worker Private Kovbasyuk calling," I heard in the phone. "I am serving in the detachment commanded by Maj Kozyub, and was discharged into the reserves a few days ago."

"Congratulations," I reply, "we wish you a good journey home."

"Thank you. But I have a question for you from my coworkers. They will not be discharged until they carry out an "agreement." And you wrote that this must not be..."

Truly, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA did write about this faulty practice. On 4 Jun 83 a review of letters was published, entitled "That Trace in Life." Soon a directive from the deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Construction and Troop Billeting was published, which prohibited levying so-called agreement tasks on military construction workers and linking their accomplishment with their discharges into the reserves. And here...

We informed Lt Col A. Popov, deputy chief of the political department in the military construction organization, about the phone call. A day later he informed the editors that there is not even a trace of any such "agreements" in the detachments, and that someone unknown had called instead of Kovbasyuk, since he had long been at home. Well, unfortunately, such things do happen.

How surprised we were when military construction workers arrived at the editors' offices. They were the same recent coworkers of Private V. Kovbasyuk. And they had the same complaint.

I go to the detachment. It has bright and well built barracks, an excellent mess hall, medical stations, a sports facility. In short, everything was as it was supposed to be.

"We are prepared to discharge tomorrow all military construction workers who have served their terms of service," Capt V. Kukharev, deputy detachment commander for political affairs, assured me. "But, the UNR [Office of the Work Supervisor] chief decides this. Agreements? He smiled enigmatically. There are no such agreements in the detachment.

Col V. Fevralitin, UNR chief, perfunctorily swept aside all the charges made against him. "We don't even know the word. They have invented these "agreements" he stated confidently. "Work is going on as usual, no one is promising anything to the soldiers, and they do not have the right to do so."

I had to bring up a few facts. Let us say that Soviet army employee B. Selivanov, UNR chief mechanic, told Jr Sgt R. Khagush, PFC V. Adamovich and privates A. Mikityuk and N. Polishchuk directly: "Lay this cable and we will immediately discharge you into the reserves." Back on 10 December the soldiers carried out this task. But Selivanov could not fulfill his promise. Col Fevralitin did not sign the order.

"No such thing happened" explained Fevralitin decisively.

But Selivanov confirmed completely everything about which the military construction troops reported. And he was surprised! "How can you not remember this, Vladimir Fedorovich? I acted according to your instructions."

In this way, to put it simply, PFCs Yu. Dunets and V. Folvarochnyy, privates V. Vinnichuk, Ye. Byvalin and F. Khayrulin, as well as many others, were deceived. Attempting somehow to justify himself, Fevralitin made reference to an order from his higher organization to discharge the military construction workers between 1 and 30 December. But, here as well he contradicted himself. Private Kh. Pogosyan, a tailor, was discharged on 23 October, and Sgt V. Varenikov, working as an artist and counted against another position, was discharged on 4 November. This list can be continued.

"In general something strange is going on here with the discharges," states Sr Warrant Officer Yu. Solodov, company 1st Sergeant. "I remember how this business was handled in my previous detachment. Lt Col V. Bogatyrenko, detachment commander, read off the list of those being discharged at the morning guard mount. They stood in front of the formation. Then the entire detachment passed by and saluted, while an orchestra played. Not to mention the celebration for them in the club or the festive farewell luncheons."

Army service is an especially valuable time for each individual. We cannot be indifferent to the frame of mind in which soldiers are discharged into the reserves. And if they depart resentful, with a bitter feeling of injustice, this largely negates the indoctrinary efforts of commanders and political officers. Is this not too much to pay for additional percentages of plan fulfillments obtained through the use of "agreements?"

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SPECIAL TROOPS

LT GEN GRYAZNOV NOTES UNDERFULFILLMENT OF CONSTRUCTION PLAN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen N. Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense: "There is Much Work Ahead -- Facilities in the Social Sphere are Our Common Concern"]

[Text] The party considers unremitting concern about solving social problems and satisfying the interests and needs of the Soviet people a law for the activity of all state and economic organs and social organizations. The level of development achieved, and the scale of the new tasks advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress, made it necessary to look anew at prospects in the social sphere and assess completely its increasing importance for achieving the program objectives of our party. Based on this, special stress in the 12th Five-Year Plan has been placed on consistent strengthening of the material and technical base of the social sphere, including the construction of residential housing and cultural and personal facilities.

During the past five-year plan in the USSR Ministry of Defense there have been built substantially more barracks, residential houses, dining facilities, clubs and officers' homes, military medical and childrens pre-school institutions, stores, baths and wash houses and general educational schools. Just the same, plan targets were not completely fulfilled. Underestimation of pressing problems of social and cultural construction on the part of some leaders, including planning organs, and an attitude toward this construction as a matter of secondary importance, had their effect.

There was also no fundamental improvement in the construction of social and cultural facilities last year. Thus, in 10 months of 1986 there were 178 planned facilities not placed in operation. Matters are particularly bad in the Baltic, Pacific, Northern and Black Sea fleets. There the annual program has been less than half fulfilled. Things are little better in the Transcaucasus, Baltic, Ural and Far Eastern military districts, and the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District and a number of others, where fulfillment of the annual plan barely surpassed 50 percent.

All this indicates that the necessary restructuring in the activity of many military construction organizations and billeting and maintenance organs has not taken place, a priority attitude toward construction of facilities in the

social sphere has not been maintained, and existing reserves are being poorly used. As a result, the annual allocations made by the Armed Services, military districts and fleets for building facilities in the social sphere are often inadequate to build them within the allotted times. There are still many shortcomings in the planning of social sphere facilities, the organization of their construction, the providing of material resources and in deliveries of equipment.

Of course, joint efforts by builders and customers are required to struggle against these shortcomings. However, in this the role and responsibility of the purchaser must be substantially increased. After all, one cannot seriously expect success where there are no timely solutions to such problems as preparation for construction, where no control has been established over the course and quality of work in accordance with construction norms and regulations, where modern construction, equipment and materials are not installed in projects, and where calculations do not reflect the true cost of the facility and as a result funds are insufficient to complete the construction.

We cannot be reconciled to the fact that funds allocated for the construction of residential housing and social and cultural facilities are not always fully assimilated. But, what took place in the Far Eastern Military District in 1985, when the plan for placing of clubs into operation was only one third fulfilled and almost 40 percent more funds than authorized were spent, is completely impermissible. Similar derelictions were disclosed in the Belorussian, Leningrad, Baltic and other military districts. This indicates that there is clearly inadequate local control over the development of the social sphere base and insufficient efficiency and coordination in the actions of purchasers and builders.

In the Moscow, Carpathian, Turkestan and Kiev military districts, where all participants in the construction of social and cultural and domestic facilities are operating in coordination, systematically and with the necessary responsibility, matters are going well. At a number of military stations they have succeeded in creating the entire complex of facilities necessary for the normal vital activities of the troops, and for improving the effectiveness of the military labor of Soviet soldiers. They are rightfully considered to be models and standards in material living conditions.

Now the task is to accelerate sharply the process of bringing all our military stations to the level of contemporary requirements. There is nothing trivial and there are no secondary questions in this matter. Restructuring of the economic mechanism, which has developed throughout the country, is opening the way to lower the cost of construction, reduce the time required and eliminate the dissipation of forces and resources among a large number of facilities. To realize these opportunities fully means to provide for accelerated development of the social sphere of our military stations.

We are still making little use of the capabilities of the community of troops, and this is a great force. The patriotic initiative of AvtoVAZ, to work without pay no fewer than four days on construction of social and cultural facilities, which was approved by the CPSU Central Committee, found a response

and support in the military collectives. After all, during construction there is always work which does not require high skills. Moreover, among servicemen there are many who have construction tools. They will willingly assist the builders or repairmen. And such assistance can have significant results if it is properly organized. Everyone who goes to a construction site in his free time must be told the task clearly, given the necessary tools and materials, shown working techniques and provided safe working conditions. It is very important to critique the work and evaluate its quality, so that the man will see that his work was of real benefit.

If construction project managers, commanders, political workers, party, trade union and komsomol organizations of military units and billeting and maintenance organizations are able to truly and enthusiastically organize such work, it will play its role in accelerating the construction of residential housing and other facilities necessary to improve the social and domestic conditions of Soviet soldiers, workers, employees and their families.

The construction of new buildings and structures is not the only way to accomplish this task. No less important is a zealous and proprietary attitude toward the existing fund, its timely repair, and the renovation of good quality old buildings. Here numerous problems have also accumulated.

Currently our plans for capital repair are only 60 percent of the normative requirement, but even they are not being completely fulfilled. Practice shows that comprehensive rather than selective capital repair of buildings, structures and military stations as a whole has the greatest effect. However, this has not yet become the main form of repair. The Transbaykal and Moscow military districts, and the Moscow PVO District, where comprehensive repair constitutes only 10-15 percent of the total, are especially lagging in this matter.

Higher targets have been established for the current five-year plan for repair of residential housing, in order to bring their numbers up to the normative requirement by 1990. Particular attention must be paid to these issues in the Transbaykal, Odessa, Belorussian and Far Eastern military districts, and the Moscow PVO District, where housing repairs during the past five-year plan were clearly insufficient.

Why has this situation arisen with respect to the repair and renovation of our existing military stations, and especially residential housing, and communal structures and networks? There are many reasons, but perhaps one of the main ones is that it is difficult to use the capabilities of military construction organizations which are involved in new construction. After all, it is known that the very nature of capital repairs for renovation of buildings and structures is often more difficult than new construction. The use of large, highly productive construction machinery and mechanisms, industrial construction techniques and flow methods is limited.

Apparently, the time has come to think seriously about making construction and repair organizations economically interested in carrying out repair work, as is done with respect to renovation and technical retooling of production enterprises.

But this is not the only way to solve the problem. It is already clear that it is necessary to immediately develop the production base of billeting and maintenance organs and repair and construction organizations. Here there are no unresolved technical or organizational problems. All that is necessary is to get involved in the matter seriously and actively. Efforts and funds invested in development of the production base will quickly be repaid with interest. It is necessary to more actively put means of mechanization into repair practice right in the work places, introduce new technologies and methods of accomplishing repairs, and make better use of other achievements of scientific and technological progress.

For these purposes the billeting and maintenance service has developed a technological development plan for the current five-year plan. It is detailed and specified in the annual plans. The first positive results have even appeared. Cold non-bituminous mastic for gluing roofing materials has begun to be introduced into repair work. This reduces labor expenditures 2.6-fold and eliminates the use of bitumen. Gypsum sheets for finishing dividing walls, which reduce labor expenditures 1.8-fold; cement strip sheets; automatic control of outside lighting of military stations; new communal equipment and small mechanical tools are being employed.

Thus far the first steps have been made, but in order to realize the opportunities opened up in these directions workers in the billeting and maintenance service at all levels must operate persistently and accurately, without awaiting any sort of additional instructions.

The successful implementation of the residential and social and domestic construction program is an important condition of the steady increase and the labor and political activeness of the Soviet people, the further increase in well-being and the all-round development of the personality. Implementing this program is a task for everyone. It is necessary to use more fully all existing capabilities and resources to accomplish it successfully.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

MEAT COMBINE EXERCISE TAKES CHERNOBYL INTO ACCOUNT

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 9 Dec 86) pp 14-15

[Article by V. Shevtsov, chief of staff for CD of a meat combine: "Complex Objective"]

[Text] We held a CD exercise simultaneously with a rayon command and staff exercise. This required more precise decisions and actions.

We began carrying out appropriate CD measures in response to an umpire's narrative problem about a surprise enemy attack. A rather complicated situation was soon created, and this contributed to the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the trainees, for they had to act under near-real conditions with high physical exertion.

Another narrative followed the first: "The compressor shop is filled with ammonia gas and the equipment is damaged." It was the emergency restoration team's turn to demonstrate its ability. Performing tasks in close coordination with the decontamination group, the fighting men and commanders essentially acted faultlessly in neutralizing the ammonia in the shop. They determined the degree of air contamination and marked boundaries of the contaminated zone. All data were immediately reported to the detachment commander during the exercise and he made decisions and issued orders to subordinates on their basis.

The presence at the combine of a virulent toxic chemical agent, ammonia (for the refrigeration shop's needs), became one of the reasons for the exercise's increased emphasis on methods of defense against SDYaV [virulent toxic chemical agents] in case of an emergency. It stands to reason that safety measures were strictly followed in practicing these lessons and at the same time indulgences and oversimplifications were excluded. The heads of all elements ensuring personal safety regarded their tasks with an increased sense of responsibility. Our fighting men also must be given their due--they proved that they were able to operate under extreme conditions.

The specific nature of the work of nonmilitarized formations established at meat industry facilities distinguishes them somewhat from other formations,

although the objectives and tasks in the CD system are the same. Here we have to simultaneously resolve matters connected with protection of animals, veterinary treatment [obrabotka], preventive inoculations, and cattle processing [pererabotka] as well. These and other measures had to be performed quickly and with quality and the cattle preserved for subsequent processing.

During the comprehensive exercise we tried not to divide training problems into important and secondary, just as we try not to do this in the training period. How did it go? Together with the city CD staff, we placed great emphasis on measures to notify the populace in case ammonia was released into the atmosphere and were guided by appropriate normative documents and the instruction on actions of command and supervisory personnel, workers, employees and the public in case this happened under our conditions. Formation readiness was checked and people practiced fulfilling norms. Territorial CD staffs monitored progress of preparation for the exercise. The author of these lines and the meat combine director, who is the facility CD chief, underwent instructional methods training at oblast courses, while formation commanders underwent such training at city courses.

V. Vishnyakov, the umpire and chief of staff for CD of the oblast meat association, gave much practical help. We were convinced once again that successful conduct of CD activities depends largely on how they are planned, how the preparatory period went, how the labor collective is trained and attuned, and how active and effective party-political work is. Now it can be said with confidence that the entire set of planned activities in the exercise was fulfilled with great benefit both for the people and for production. Such results always justify the efforts and resources expended and bring satisfaction both to trainees and to the leadership.

Considering that our exercise took place some time after the accident at the Chernobylskaya AES [Atomic Electric Power Station], we intensified political indoctrination and explanatory work, which allowed each person to perceive the need for civil defense more objectively. For example, after deepening their knowledge and skills in using dosimetric instruments in city CD courses, personnel of the RKhN [radiation and chemical observation] post themselves became good instructors. Interest in the radiation situation in our area is fully understandable, and people had an opportunity to measure for themselves the radiation level, become convinced of the total safety and tell colleagues about the actual state of affairs.

After the comprehensive exercise we decided to use the radiationproof shelter as a CD classroom where it is possible to show movies during the noon break. Ping-pong competitions also are held there. Thus by coming here combine personnel also become familiar with materials revealing the essence of CD measures.

...Col V. Chopovskiy, oblast chief of staff for CD, gave a high evaluation of our actions at the critique of the rayon command and staff exercise and presented the "USSR Civil Defense Outstanding Person" badge to A. Khoptinets, director and CD chief of the meat combine, and a certificate to party organization secretary N. Guricheva. This was an evaluation of the work and

efforts of the entire collective and of the party, trade union, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations. As A. Klimov, first secretary of the party's Romny Gorkom, said in his statement, however, this evaluation is also an advance payment for the future.

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REAR SERVICES/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

TRADE WORKERS' 1987 SOCIALIST COMPETITION CHALLENGE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 8 Jan 87 p 1

[Unsigned Article: "To Work Effectively, With High Quality"]

[Text] Workers at the leading military trading organization of the Belorussian Military District trade administration, led by V. Mironov, dealt successfully with their plan targets for 1986. The military trading organization collective, in accepting its socialist commitments for 1987, appealed to all workers in military trade, challenging them to develop socialist competition to improve fundamentally the level of domestic services trade support of military personnel, effective economic management under the new conditions of planning, economic incentives and control, and an economical attitude toward material goods resources, under the slogan, "We Will Mark the 70th Anniversary of Great October With Effective Work and High Quality Service."

APPEAL BY THE MILITARY TRADE ORGANIZATION COLLECTIVE OF THE BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT TRADE ADMINISTRATION TO ALL WORKERS IN MILITARY TRADE:

Dear Comrades!

Having entered into socialist competition for a worthy celebration of the 70th Anniversary of Great October, and fulfilling the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, our military trade organization collective is concentrating its main efforts on fundamentally improving domestic services trade support for military personnel, family members and Soviet Army workers and employees, more fully satisfying the growing demand for varied and high quality consumer goods, and substantially improving the quality and caliber of service.

Having analyzed the results of the first year of the 12th Five-Year Plan, and having weighed our capabilities, military trade organization workers have accepted the following socialist commitments for 1987:

to fulfill the retail trade turnover plan by 25 December;

to place into operation a shop for weighing out and packing food products which fully meets the requirements of the stores for packaged goods; to

implement centralized delivery of industrial goods to military trade organization stores;

to transfer stores with more than three workers to operations with a single accounting center;

to provide customers a number of additional services;

to improve in every way the work of public catering bodies, improve the quality of food preparation and the caliber of service; to bring the share of our own products in public catering trade turnover to 82 percent; to equip a shop for semi-finished meat products and provide all garrison dining halls with them; to obtain from pig fattening farms and deliver to public catering enterprises no less than 200 centners of meat;

to improve the work of distributing social and political literature and pay special attention to popularizing materials of the 27th CPSU Congress; to increase the buy up of books from the population to 15 percent of the commodity exchange of printed publications;

to improve everyday services to the population; to produce only good and excellent quality products and eliminate instances of complaints about the caliber and quality of service;

to conduct trade fairs, sales exhibitions, domestic services days, trips to remote garrisons, and increase their number 5 percent over that planned;

to carry out renovation and technical re-tooling of 15 percent of all trade enterprises during the year, in order to reduce substantially manual labor and accelerate the introduction of technical achievements;

to improve auditing work and ensure strict observance of economizing and complete preservation of material goods valuables;

to achieve a substantial improvement in productivity, through introducing in all enterprises the brigade form of labor organization, with wage payments according to collective piece-work evaluations and distribution of collective wages taking into consideration the labor contribution of each worker; to reduce the number of workers by 2 percent in the first quarter of 1987;

to use the human factor more fully in fulfilling plan targets and socialist commitments; for this purpose to continue to improve the organization of labor and the political, economic and professional training of cadres.

The military trade collective calls upon all workers in military trade to support its appeal and to develop socialist competition widely, to fulfill the plan targets of the second year of the 12th Five-Year Plan early, and to mark the 70th Anniversary of Great October with new labor successes.

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Lt GEN MOSYAYKIN ON DOSAAF ANNIVERSARY

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 9 Dec 86) pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Gen V. Mosyaykin, deputy chairman of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "A Mass Defense Society"; first two paragraphs are VOYENNYE ZNANIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] And so a new page has been opened in the glorious annals of the world's first socialist state. The new year of 1987 has come into its own. For Soviet citizens and for all progressive mankind this will be above all the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the beginning of the most just society on our planet.

For millions of DOSAAF members the first month of the new year will be marked by one other important event--the 60th anniversary of the Order of Lenin and Order of Red Banner All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy.

In a New Stage

The Defense Society's work saw further development in postwar times. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree of 7 May 1966 entitled "Status and Measures for Improving the Work of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy (USSR DOSAAF)" became a program document for the Society which defined the direction and content of all work for a lengthy period. In fulfilling it, Society committees and organizations increased attention to basic military training of the youth. The task posed here is to see that every young lad acquires military and military-technical knowledge even before call-up into the Armed Forces.

By Ukase of 21 January 1977 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium awarded the Order of Lenin to the Defense Society for the great contribution to the development of mass defense work and preparation of workers for defense of the socialist homeland. This served as an important stimulus for further improvement of military-patriotic indoctrination and of all mass defense work.

Members of the multimillion-member Defense Society received with great enthusiasm the CPSU Central Committee greeting to the 9th All-Union DOSAAF

Congress held in February 1983, which stated in particular: "The duty of DOSAAF organizations is to improve mass defense work, military-patriotic indoctrination and propaganda of military knowledge among the populace. They must improve the quality in training specialists for the Armed Forces and cadres of mass technical trades for the national economy and ensure further development of technical and applied military sports."

The party's direction was embodied in practical affairs of DOSAAF committees and organizations. Their role in patriotic indoctrination of its members, in teaching fundamentals of military affairs and in giving people access to active participation in technical and applied military sports rose everywhere.

Soviet citizens received the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress as a fighting program of action. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade M. S. Gorbachev stated in the Political Report to the congress: "The most important thing now is to convert the energy of concepts into the energy of specific actions."

In response to the party's call, the country's workers and all party members joined actively in great, intensive work to carry out the outlined plans. This is also typical of Defense Society collectives. They are guided in their work by provisions of the CPSU Program and congress documents to the effect that so long as the danger of imperialism unleashing aggressive wars and military conflicts exists, the party will give unremitting attention to reinforcing the USSR's defense might and strengthening its security and the Armed Forces' readiness to defeat any aggressor. The party Program emphasizes: "Every party member and every Soviet citizen is obligated to do everything dependent on him or her for keeping the country's defense capability at the proper level."

Taking advantage of conditions created in the country for a bold search, truthful conclusions, and the overcoming of formalism and bureaucratism, our committees are perfecting their organizational work and striving to develop the initiative of the Society's authorized personnel and social aktiv.

For example, the DOSAAF city committee of Kuznetsk in Penza Oblast relied on support of the CPSU GK [city committee] and gorispolkom in drawing up a comprehensive, long-term plan which includes improving the forms and methods of military-patriotic indoctrination of workers and of the pupils of tekhnikums, SPTU [agricultural vocational-technical schools] and secondary schools as well as building up the necessary material-technical base for this.

Mass defense work is accomplished on a planned, purposeful basis by DOSAAF organizations of Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Bryansk and Kuybyshev oblasts. The course toward comprehensive resolution of indoctrination tasks and toward activating organizational work of committees is one of the basic courses for us.

Task Number One

The Defense Society does much for young people's immediate preparation for service in the Soviet Army and Navy. This is our task number one. DOSAAF now

has training organizations in its make-up in which draftees receive one of the military-technical specialties. The majority of our schools and air clubs are located in well-planned buildings and have a modern training facility. The Taganrog and Alma-Ata motor vehicle schools, the Kiev, Riga and Tashkent naval schools, the Krasnodar and Kuybyshev radiotechnical schools, and the Third Moscow Air Club can be included among them. A number of DOSAAF schools won the honorary right to be called model schools in socialist competition for a worthy greeting to the 27th CPSU Congress.

The achievements are noticeable; nevertheless, there still are many shortcomings and much formalism in the job of quality preparation of the youth for Armed Forces duty.

In implementing resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress on matters of strengthening national defense capability and the Armed Forces' combat might, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree in June 1986 aimed at further improving the preparation of young people for military service. Party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs and corresponding ministries and departments including DOSAAF were assigned to carry out additional measures to raise the level of young people's predraft training, to improve their physical conditioning and to develop military-patriotic indoctrination.

In connection with publication of the aforementioned decree, the majority of DOSAAF organizations analyzed their work with young people of predraft age thoroughly and self-critically and determined specific ways of fulfilling party and government requirements. It was decided to concentrate basic efforts above all on raising the quality of specialist training for the Armed Forces in Defense Society training organizations and to improve the training-methods management of basic military training at training points of enterprises, establishments, kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

It is common knowledge that over two million persons a year undergo technical training in the Defense Society. Specialists prepared in DOSAAF are working successfully on the BAM [Baykal-Amur Railroad], in the Tyumen oilfields, and in the non-Chernozem zone of the RSFSR. These basically are transportation equipment drivers, radio operators, electricians and excavator operators capable of joining military formation at any moment.

The Defense Society was given the task of developing technical and applied military sports in the country which arm future soldiers with technical and military knowledge and contribute to their development of high moral-combat qualities and their acquisition of firm physical conditioning. DOSAAF organizations joined actively in fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "A Further Upsurge in Mass Physical Culture and Sport."

The Games of USSR Peoples in technical and applied military sports became a major event in our country's sports life of last year. Hundreds of thousands

of young boys and girls took part in various competitions during the Games, and many of them became masters of sport and record-holders. RSFSR athletes took team first place, those of the Ukraine took second place and those of Moscow took third place.

The fact that the number of young lads who leave for the Army as masters and candidate masters of sport and as ranking athletes has increased of late attests to an upsurge in the mass nature of technical and applied military sports. For example, everyone is familiar with the names of outstanding athletes Aleksey Ishutin, Boris Klyushnikov and Ivan Gerasimenko. Called into the Army, they soon became outstanding in combat and political training and earned more than one commendation for their military labor.

The Voluntary Society is proud of the fact that DOSAAF products Lt Col Vasiliy Shcherbakov, Lt Col Yuriy Kuznetsov, Capt Nabi Akramov and WO [praporshchik] Viktor Kapshuk are among the Heroes of the Soviet Union who received this high title for exploits performed in fulfilling international duty in Afghanistan. The Order of Lenin was conferred on former Sgt Aleksandr Novak, the orders of Red Star on twin brothers Aleksandr and Andrey Kamolov, and many other soldiers received state awards.

At the same time, resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and of subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums obligate Defense Society organizations to conduct a further search for improving the effectiveness of all mass defense work and military-patriotic indoctrination and for developing technical and applied military sports. Shortcomings in preparing the youth for service in the Armed Forces must be decisively eliminated and primary attention should be given to the level of draftees' practical training and to their mental and physical conditioning. There are substantial shortcomings in this matter in DOSAAF schools of Udmurt and Kalmyk ASSR's and of Ryazan and Kirov oblasts. We cannot be reconciled with that state of affairs today.

Reorientation demands that all of us have a heightened sense of responsibility for the assigned job and the ability to assess what has been done fundamentally and self-critically and display a Bolshevik character in the struggle against everything not conforming to principles of socialism. At the same time, work in a new way does not at all signify merely the correction of blunders and errors. Above all this is a perceptible addition in quality, a strengthening of businesslike efficiency, and innovation in order to make fuller use of the material-technical base and to raise the level of military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and the level of their preparation for military service even higher.

The 27th party congress advanced for Soviet citizens the task of our country's accelerated social and economic development. It is the duty of each person in the Defense Society to join actively in practical work to carry out plans outlined by the party and make his or her contribution to the job of further improving the Motherland's defense might.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. BASE STRATEGY IN MEDITERRANEAN SAID 'DESTABILIZING FACTOR'

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 1, Jan 87 pp 9-11

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Valentin Rodionov]

[Text] In recent years the USA has not only preserved, but has significantly expanded the network of its military bases on NATO's southern flank.

The Pentagon currently has here about 200 military bases and facilities, including: 6 military bases in Spain, 10 large bases and more than 50 other facilities in Italy, 4 bases and over 30 other facilities in Greece. Up to 60 US military facilities, including 7 large bases, are located in Turkey; for the most part, they are to be used in anti-USSR military actions in Transcaucasia or against the Balkan socialist states, as well as a transshipment base for transfers of rapid deployment forces to the Middle East.

The USA has created in the region a system of storage and preparation for combat use of NUCLEAR AMMUNITION AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. For example, in Italy, Turkey and Greece there are from 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear charges, nuclear warheads for Lance and Honest John missiles, atomic ammunition for 155-mm and 203-mm howitzers, and nuclear mines.

US Italian stockpiles include about 600 units of nuclear weaponry, those in Turkey over 500, and in Greece 160. In Turkey eleven depots and storage points for nuclear ammunition are located in the towns of Izmit, Incirli, Erzurum, Eskisehir, Murted and elsewhere. US troops in Italy have a varied nuclear armoury. Portable atomic demolition munitions, including those for sabotage and terrorist actions, 155-mm rounds for M-109 howitzers, nuclear rounds for 203-mm howitzers, and warheads for Lance and tactical missiles and Nike Hercules antiaircraft missiles, among others, are there. Nuclear charges for Honest John missiles in Greece are concentrated in Langadhas and Drama; nuclear warheads for antiaircraft guided missiles in Eleusis; atomic air bombs are being kept at the bases in Tanagra, Araxos, Iraklion, and artillery nuclear shells and atomic mines in Kilkis, Yiannitsa and elsewhere.

The US military-political leadership has also gained base availability for the deployment of its armed forces in other countries of the Mediterranean, especially in its eastern part. There are already here over 10 military facilities placed formally under national control. Under the achieved agreements, the Pentagon can use for its purposes military bases in another four Mediterranean states: an air base in Morocco, two air bases and the Haifa naval base in Israel, three air bases--Cairo West, Eytam and Etzion--in Egypt, and the Lefkoniko air base and a naval base in the northern part of Cyprus occupied by Turkish forces.

There is a broad Pentagon network of intelligence centres near socialist countries' borders. Thus, in Turkey US intelligence centres feature in Karamursel, Kargaburun, Sinop, Pirincli and Belbashi, near Ankara. They are part of the American global system of electronic surveillance. The centres have radars for detection and tracking of artificial Earth satellites and intercontinental missiles, and also modern optical-electronic devices to track surface, ground and air targets.

A US special base aircraft command operates from Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey; it has 20 R-3 Orion and B-2 Hawkeye patrol planes conducting electronic reconnaissance. Four RS-135 planes of US strategic aviation do a similar job from Greek territory, and high-altitude spy planes operate from Cyprus.

Washington has organized an AWACS early warning system in NATO countries. For this job 18 E-3A Sentry planes have been detailed. Bases at Konya, Turkey, and Akte (Preveza), Greece have three such planes each. Their function is to gather intelligence on the armed forces and military facilities of socialist and Arab countries. The US armed forces' command has also got a large-scale updating programme for NATO's Nadge air defence system, whose 14 early warning posts are scattered across the territory of Turkey; several of its stations are in Greece.

An over-65,000-strong forward echelon of US armed forces is stationed at American bases in the Mediterranean and on Sixth Fleet ships. It is this echelon that ensures the maintenance in battle readiness of nuclear missiles and other types of mass destruction weapons; and of the material-technical base for deploying US army contingents in the region in a crisis situation.

The US military bases in the Mediterranean are a serious destabilising factor and a source of war danger.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON U.S. MILITARY NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS OVER 20 YEARS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 9 Jan 87 p 3

[Unsigned Article: "'Nuclear Autographs' of the Pentagon"]

[Text] During the past 20 years more than 600 incidents with nuclear weapons were registered in the U.S. armed forces.

"Suddenly my eyes began to burn. They became more and more red and swollen... Some of kind of strange rash appeared all over my body and it became difficult to move. And, when not a single doctor could determine the reason for my illness, I thought that it might be the consequence of my work in Greenland..."

These are the words of one of the Danish port workers who was sent in 1968 to an icy island to eliminate the traces of an aviation disaster. Deadly dangerous traces, emphasizes the Polish newspaper TRIBUNA LUDA, which carried the workers' story. You see, the traces were left by an American B-52 bomber, which carried four nuclear bombs, each with a yield of over one megaton.

The aircraft, which took off at the American base in Tule, in the northern part of the island, crashed and was destroyed on the Greenland ice on the night of 21 January 68. Along with the aircraft, its dangerous cargo also scattered into countless pieces, contaminating a huge territory with deadly radioactive radiation. The American authorities did not inform the world at the time about the true scale of the catastrophe. Hundreds of Danish workers sent to the island to collect fragments of the aircraft knew nothing about the radiation threat.

The earnestly hushed up accident again attracted public attention last summer when Danish mass information media became interested in the alarming reports by people who, even many years after being at the location of the catastrophe, grew ill and observed strange phenomena in themselves, like the loss of their fingernails and toenails, burning eyes and fevers. The alarm raised in the press brought results. The authorities stated their intention to send approximately 1,000 workers, who worked in Greenland soon after the accident, for medical examination. Based on the results of these examinations the workers could count on compensation, like for any other "occupational injury."

This end to the sad story does not suit the victims. One must not close his eyes to the fact, they state in interviews given to Danish newspapers, that actually we are talking about the "first Danish victims of nuclear weapons."

Other incidents include the following:

In May 1957 a hydrogen bomb with a yield of more than 10 megatons fell to earth in the vicinity of Albuquerque, from a U. S. Air Force B-36 strategic bomber, flying from Biggs Air Base, Texas to Curtland Base, New Mexico, as a result of a technical malfunction. Only by pure chance did the nuclear mechanism not go off.

On 17 Jan 66 an American B-52 strategic bomber and a refueling aircraft collided in the sky over the Spanish village of Palomares. As a result, several nuclear bombs fell to earth. And, although there was no explosion, scientists believe that there remains health-threatening radioactive contamination of the area to the present day.

During the period from 1965 through 1972 each year an average of 30 incidents associated with nuclear weapons occurred in the U. S. Navy alone.

In September 1980 a B-52 strategic bomber loaded with nuclear bombs burned for three hours at Grand Forks Base, North Dakota.

In 1980 there was an explosion in a Titan-2 ICBM silo in Damascus, Arkansas. The nuclear warhead was thrown out of the silo and fell to earth.

In January 1985 a Pershing-2 missile engine blew up at a U. S. Air Force base near Heilbronn (FRG). Three American servicemen were killed and another 18 wounded.

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BRIEFS

COMPOSITES FOR ROTOR BLADES--According to the journal INTERAVIA, as a result of 15 years of research the British firm Westland has created blades out of composite material for the main rotors of helicopters. The newly designed blade consists of a core of acrylic foam covered by carbon-reinforced and glass-reinforced plastics. Compared with existing metallic blades, those made of composite materials will have higher fatigue strength and corrosion resistance and, consequently, also longer operating life. Their shape will make it possible to increase thrust 30-40 percent. Westland is placing main and tail rotors with blades made out of composite materials on its new TT300 helicopter. Its takeoff weight is 7.2 tons, capacity is 14 men and lift capacity (external suspension) is 2.7 tons. It is intended that composite blades will be placed on Sea King Mark-4 helicopters. West German specialists are working on composite blades. Their employment on the VO-105 helicopter should increase its payload by 200 kg and its maximum speed by 50 km per hour. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 7 Jan 87 p 3] 9069

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